Revisiting Modernization Theory in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Relationship Between Industrialization and Democratization by Eltringham, Peter B.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-06
Revisiting Modernization Theory in Sub-Saharan
Africa: the Relationship Between Industrialization
and Democratization
Eltringham, Peter B.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
REVISITING MODERNIZATION THEORY IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 








 Thesis Advisor:                                            Naazneen H. Barma 
 Second Reader:                                            Robert E. Looney 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Revisiting Modernization Theory in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: The Relationship Between Industrialization and Democratization 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Peter B. Eltringham 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ______N/A______.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The relationship between industrialization and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa is one of interdependence and 
balance unique to the characteristics and capacity of three critical entities: the state, private capitalists and labor. Case 
specific reviews of this critical relationship assist in the general understanding of how industrial characteristics 
contribute to certain social requisites for democracy. In the cases of South Africa, Gabon, Senegal and Burundi, an 
increase in industrial diversification roughly correlates to increases in the satisfaction of social requisites for 
democracy. Senegal, Gabon and Burundi each demonstrate a lack of industrial diversity and a relative imbalance in 
the power dynamic between the three critical entities. This contributes to divergent degrees of satisfaction of social 
requisites and autocratic tendencies in lieu of the democratic. In South Africa, diversified industrialization exists and 
thrives alongside consolidated democracy. In this case, each of the well-developed critical entities is able to exert 
effective pressure upon the others and social requisites for democracy are largely met. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
129 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Sub-Saharan Africa, Modernization, Industrialization, Democratization, 
Contingent Democrat Theory, Social Requisites for Democracy, South Africa, Gabon, Senegal, 
Burundi 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
REVISITING MODERNIZATION THEORY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 




Peter B. Eltringham 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., The Pennsylvania State University, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Daniel J. Moran 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The relationship between industrialization and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
one of interdependence and balance unique to the characteristics and capacity of three 
critical entities: the state, private capitalists and labor. Case specific reviews of this 
critical relationship assist in the general understanding of how industrial characteristics 
contribute to certain social requisites for democracy. In the cases of South Africa, Gabon, 
Senegal and Burundi, an increase in industrial diversification roughly correlates to 
increases in the satisfaction of social requisites for democracy. Senegal, Gabon and 
Burundi each demonstrate a lack of industrial diversity and a relative imbalance in the 
power dynamic between the three critical entities. This contributes to divergent degrees 
of satisfaction of social requisites and autocratic tendencies in lieu of the democratic. In 
South Africa, diversified industrialization exists and thrives alongside consolidated 
democracy. In this case, each of the well-developed critical entities is able to exert 
effective pressure upon the others and social requisites for democracy are largely met. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between industrialization 
and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, this research will be an 
examination of the political economies of selected countries as a means to compare and 
contrast regional experiences with the transition to industry-based economies, the 
contemporary effects of unique industrialization patterns, alignment to social requisites 
for democracy and the resultant progress towards democratic governance. The thesis will 
begin with a review of the major research question, importance, hypothesis, problems, 
sources, methodology and a brief literature review of salient sources. It will then establish 
a theoretical framework by analyzing modernization and development theory, the world 
system, industrialization and democratization within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Following this, case studies will be presented in order to delineate and measure “low,” 
“middle” and “high” performing country experiences with industrial and democratic 
transitions. Utilizing the information gathered from these case studies, this thesis will 
then compare and contrast the extent to which political, economic and social effects of 
industrialization satisfy social requisites for democracy as a means of testing the 
hypothesis. Conclusions from these comparisons will be drawn and the thesis will close 
with a brief exploration of the implications of these conclusions. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND IMPORTANCE 
Trajectories of economic development in the many countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) diverge considerably. As SSA countries endeavor to modernize and close 
the gap with the developed world, the ways in which they pursue economic growth have 
run remarkably different courses. Multiple internal and external influences have assisted 
in shaping these trajectories while extensive research has been directed at charting their 
unique developmental patterns. In turn, the levels of industrialization and democratization 
are key points of political, social and economic intersection with the global community. 
Industrial and democratic capacity contributes significantly to international relationships 
and the degree to which a country may compete or interact internationally along political, 
social and economic lines. As these two dynamics are critical factors individually within 
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the modernization, development and international relations fields, understanding how 
they relate to each other may assist in the larger explanation as to what accounts for the 
divergence of developmental trajectories within the region. Understanding the 
relationship between industrial and democratic patterns can contribute to the development 
debate in terms of identifying the roots of stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa. This brings 
us to the major research question: what is the nature of the relationship between 
industrialization and democratization within Sub Saharan Africa? 
Beyond its influence upon international relationships, development, particularly 
economic development, plays a critical role for humanity at large. According to Amartya 
Sen, “development is all about freedom in the broadest sense.” Economic development 
increases one’s ability to choose the type and quality of life one desires. 1  Development 
is important, literally, to everyone. Within the African context, the political, economic 
and social environments vary greatly across the continent. However, common to each 
population is the search for economic opportunity and the freedom to live long, 
prosperous lives.  
Exploring the link between industrialization and democratization in the Sub-
Saharan African context provides a review of the relationship between two prominent 
phenomena within the modernization, development, and international relations fields. 
This research seeks to explain the relationship between industrialization and 
democratization as a means to better understand the divergent patterns of modernization 
within SSA and the presence or absence of salient social requisites for democracy. Eva 
Bellin and Seymour Martin Lipset have established the theoretical baseline via Bellin’s 
“Contingent Democrat” theory and Lipset’s “Social Requisites for Democracy.” This 
approach regionally narrows the discussion as well as highlights and analyzes the 
contemporary variance of industrial and political spheres within Sub-Saharan Africa.  
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Scholars in the modernization and development fields have highlighted numerous, 
often controversial, variables that have been proven to affect the social, political and 
                                                 
1 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), pg. 14. 
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economic trajectories of peoples and nations. One cannot deny the impact of colonialism, 
religious missionaries, civil and international warfare, corruption, clientelism, patrimony, 
ethnicity, culture or tribalism on the shape and form of Sub-Saharan African 
development. However, this research will focus on the relationship between 
industrialization and democratization. In the proposed research, the depth and breadth of 
contributing or intervening variables will be limited to the extent to which they apply to 
the relationship between industrialization and democratization within Sub Saharan Africa 
or how divergent patterns of industrialization within the region have contributed to the 
presence of prominent social requisites for democracy. 
Seymor Martin Lipset offers several conditions as precursors to supporting 
democracy once established in the quest for modernity. Democracy, once implemented, 
needs momentum and must create social supports in the form of institutions in order to 
prevail in crisis as well as create economic growth en route to garnering and maintaining 
popular legitimacy. 2 Lipset distances himself from the emergence of democracy and 
caveats his work with the acknowledgment that despite the existence of favorable 
conditions for democracy, adverse historical events may challenge popular views on the 
legitimacy of democratic ideals to endure crisis. 3 Lipset unveils his economic 
development complex as the measured levels of industrialization, wealth, urbanization 
and education. Further, Lipset offers a diagram that designates the following as requisite 
conditions that combine to facilitate democracy: an open class system, economic wealth, 
an egalitarian value system, a capitalist economy, widespread literacy and high 
participation in voluntary organizations.4  
It is anticipated that this research will show that industrialization, in particular its 
effects on economic diversification and growth, is a necessary condition for successful 
modernization and development, shaping the conditions for the emergence and  
                                                 
2 Seymour Martin Lipset. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." American Political Science Review 
53, no. 1 (1959): 69—105. pg.72.  
3 Ibid., pg. 45. 
4 Ibid., pg. 45. 
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sustainment of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. More simply, industrialization is not 
dependent upon democratization; but successful democratization is dependent upon 
industrialization. 
C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will utilize a comparative case study approach in order to cross 
compare the vastly different modernization experiences within the Sub-Saharan African 
region. Patterns of industrialization and democratization alongside salient influential 
factors of several Sub-Saharan African nations will be analyzed. A “low performer” such 
as Burundi, a “middle performer” such as Senegal and “high performers” such as South 
Africa and Gabon represent what can be considered the full spectrum of industrial 
capacity and democratic governance within the region. This thesis will develop, for each 
set of countries, a general causal narrative that demonstrates the case-specific sequencing 
of democratization alongside industrial capacity in each instance. Individual country 
levels of industrialization and democratization relative to regional averages determine 
specific countries within low, middle or high performer categories.  
Measuring industrialization in terms of economic and social outcomes is both 
necessary and problematic. Economically, returning to Lipset’s model, he simplistically 
utilizes the percentage of males in agriculture and per capita energy consumed as indices 
of industrialization in his efforts to explain correlations between economic development 
and democracy. 5 The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 
perhaps, represents the opposite extreme in complexity. In an attempt at brevity, their 
statistics, broken down by country and drawn from such sources as the United Nations 
Statistics Division (UNSD), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are in terms 
of GDP, MVA (Manufacturing Value Added or GDP generated by the manufacturing  
                                                 
5 Seymour Martin Lipset. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." American Political Science Review 
53, no. 1 (1959): 69—105. pg. 76. 
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sector), and MVA derivatives. 6 For the purposes of this research, industrialization will 
be measured in terms of UNIDO’s elements as well as energy capacity, consumption and 
contribution to GDP rates of the four economic sectors.  
In order to approximate the emergence of democracy relative to autocratic 
tendency within the political arena, polity IV data can be used. The “polity score” 
basically captures the nature of political authority along a scale with the extremes being a 
complete autocracy in the form of a hereditary monarchy (-10 score) on the left end and a 
fully institutionalized and consolidated democracy (+10 score) on the far right. The use of 
polity IV data provides a sound quantitative reference point for the more qualitative 
patterns of democratization within each case study. 
As stated previously, my hypothesis is that industrialization, as a process of 
economic diversification, is a necessary condition for modernization and development, 
which then shapes the conditions for the emergence and sustainment of democracy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, industrialization is not dependent upon 
democratization; however, successful democratization is dependent upon diversified 
industrialization. I intend to evaluate this hypothesis by examining industrialization 
capacity and associated patterns as the independent variables. The social and economic 
outcomes of these characteristics and patterns will be measured and utilized as 
intervening variables for comparison to the social requisites for democracy, also 
intervening variables. The dependent variable will be the measured level of democracy. 
Specifically, this research will determine the level of industrialization and its outcomes in 
terms of class structures, urbanization, advances in technology, communication, electric 
power production, social mobilization, skills and education. These variables will then be 
assessed as to their fulfillment of Lipset’s requisites for democracy, namely an open class 
system, economic wealth, an egalitarian value system, a capitalist economy, widespread 
literacy and high participation in voluntary organizations. Finally, these social requisites 
will be mapped against the level of democracy. 
                                                 
6 United Nations Industrial Development Organization, accessed August 23, 2011, 
http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=1001503.  
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Both qualitative and quantitative examinations of primary and secondary sources 
will be utilized. Primary sources will generally include published works by authors with 
the modernization, development, economics and international relations fields. Books, 
professional journals, and reviews will provide a historical and contemporary baseline of 
developmental economics and politics from which secondary sources will further expand. 
Secondary sources such as Internet-based resources, media outlets, official documents 
and websites of government agencies (i.e. State Department, Freedom House, Polity IV, 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Transparency International, United States 
Agency for International Development, etc.) will contribute amplifying qualitative data 
and supporting references. 
It is likely that there are gaps in existing economic data prior to the 1970s. As 
many Sub-Saharan African nations underwent post-colonial transition during this time 
period, it is assumed that record keeping may present challenges to accuracy and 
availability. Likewise, based upon the openness of certain governments, contemporary 
data will likely also be problematic. Finally, there will likely be other contributors to the 
social requisites of democracy potentially unrelated to industrial development. Every 
effort to acknowledge these instances will be made. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review seeks to unpack the various concepts to understanding the 
relationship between industrialization and democratization within the context of Sub-
Saharan Africa. It will highlight consensus and disagreements within the prominent 
literature concerning the world system, modernization, development and growth 
concepts, as well as industrialization and democratization. The causal sequencing of the 
various components of modernity, in particular industrialization and democratization, 
remain a key disagreement within the literature. This thesis will focus on addressing the 
sequencing of industrialization and democratization in the context of contemporary Sub-
Saharan African development. The goal will be to develop generalizable conclusions that 
speak to the broader debate.  
 7
The question of modernity is a matter of perspective, which is why the notion of 
modernization has oscillated in and out of favor and prominence within the circles of 
academia, foreign affairs professionals, governments, international finance institutions, 
NGOs and development organizations. The end state of modernity has become a core 
question, as has the nature of societies at large and the paths travelled along the way. 
Have we seen the end of history as Fukuyama suggests? 7 Is the liberal democratic 
system driven by capitalism and profit yet representative of the people and responsive to 
popular demands the most effective and efficient method of organization? Is the laissez-
faire market economy the answer? Will a democratic, authoritarian or theocratic political 
leadership carry a state or nation most beneficially to the globally interlaced future?  Or, 
as Huntington asserts, is the world comprised of incompatible civilizations moving along 
their own trajectories? 8 Is the world forever destined for conflict, challenge, peaks and 
valleys of prosperity? Different strands of the literature on modernization, 
industrialization and development provide varied answers to such questions. 
World-systems theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Barry K. Gills, Immanuel 
Wallerstein and Samir Amin may often whole-heartedly disagree on specific details, but 
they coalesce to present a global or near global functionally interactive environment 
based upon capitalism as its preferred “mode of production” in modernity. 9 Also of note 
is their reference to a center-periphery structure at work within the global system and the 
associated dependencies that largely define international economic relationships.  10 The 
true depth of the integration of the global economy is controversial as analysts produce 
research highlighting its challenges to national sovereignty and democracy or the actual 
degree to which the international community participates in economic transactions as a 
                                                 
7 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" In Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of 
War and Peace. 3rd ed., (New York: Pearson Education, Summer, 1989), 6.  
8 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" In Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on 
Causes of War and Peace. 3rd ed., (New York: Pearson Education, 1993), 34.  
9 Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills. The World System: Five Hundred Years Or Five Thousand. 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1993), xxi and 3. 
10 Ibid., 3. 
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fraction of GDP. 11 However, controversial or popular these concepts may be, they 
stretch back well before contemporary discussion, as African leaders recognized 
subordinate roles in the world system as well as the need and desire to transform beyond 
the traditional society. John Dube, in early Twentieth Century South Africa, during the 
rise of Zulu nationalism, noted such trajectory endpoints as the “higher places of 
civilization” or “the backward…. abyss of the antiquated tribal system” and sought an 
“honoured place among nations.” 12 Economic development, it seems, is needed to 
become competitive, reap the benefits of international commerce, and join the ranks of 
the modern world.  
Modernization theory spans from the mid Nineteenth Century through to today. In 
general, it is a theory of development and societal change. The early debate revolved 
around the distinguishing characteristics of traditional and modern societies, their 
organization principle, and methods and degree of social interaction. Characterizing 
society largely as a biological organism, early concepts of modernization viewed societal 
change as a natural process of continuous evolution. 13 Traditional societies can be 
measured in terms of a system of kinship and family while the modern consist of 
contractual relationships. 14 Emile Durkheim viewed traditional society’s organization 
slightly differently. In his theory, traditional society progressed from distant, self-
sufficient groups that gradually coalesced to increasingly dense populations, competing 
for survival and developing differentiated roles en route to interdependence upon each 
other. 15  
Beyond the conceptual origins, modernization theory brings together the fields of 
politics, social systems and economics. Raising the contentious question of a liberal 
                                                 
11 Pankaj Ghemawat. "Why the World Isn't Flat." Foreign Policy Magazine (2007); Dani Rodrik, The 
Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. (London and New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2011).   
12 Nicholas Cope. "The Zulu Petit Bourgeoisie and Zulu Nationalism in the 1920s: Origins of 
Inkatha." Journal of Southern African Studies 16, no. 3 (1990). 435. 
13 Herbert Spencer, On Social Evolution: Selected Writings (University of Chicago Press, 1972).  
14 Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: It’s Connection with the Early History of Society and its 
Relation to Modern Idea (Charles Scribner, 1864).  
15 Emile Durkheim. The Division of Labor in Society (Free Press, 1964).  
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democratic political end state, Seymour Martin Lipset provides what is popularly viewed 
as the foundational text for modernization theory in 1959. Lipset overtly connects the 
economic vibrancy of a nation to the sustainment of democracy in his oft-cited quote, 
“Concretely, the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy.” 16 Lipset’s theory establishes economic development as the driver for social 
change, which additively enhances the progression towards and support of democratic 
political systems. In his view, these three variables are neatly packaged together. Notably, 
Lipset cites Max Weber in the course of his article, highlighting a key tenet of 
modernization thought. Lipset concurs with Weber’s suggestion that modern democracy 
is dependent upon capitalist industrialization as he goes on to demonstrate that the 
average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education is 
much higher for the more democratic countries within his study. 17  
Samuel Huntington, conversely, is a proponent of the disaggregation of political 
development from modernization. He is concerned with the rapid pace of increasing 
social mobilization and participation as saboteurs to political institutions. 18 A lack of 
sufficiently strong institutions is an all too common theme of political discourse within 
the developing world. For Huntington and his followers, economic and social 
development that outpaces the growth of political institutions is a flashpoint for 
instability because political institutions are required to secure the population, provide 
services for them and maintain accountability. 19 Huntington cites Lucian Pye and Karl 
Deutsch as he explains the necessity of differentiating the economic and political 
elements of modernization and the critical issue of social mobilization. Political and 
economic development is measured by starkly different elements and therefore a single 
                                                 
16 Seymour Martin Lipset. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." American Political Science 
Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69—105. 75. 
17 Ibid., 73 and 75. Lipset cites Weber from “Zur Lage der burgerlichen Demokratie in Russland,” 
Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft and Sozialpolitik, Vol 22 (1906), pp. 346ff. 
18 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay." World Politics 17, no. 3 (Apr., 
1965): pp. 386-430. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009286., 386. 
19 Ibid. 
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scale is inappropriate for conceptualizing and measuring modernization. 20 Social 
mobilization is the critical precursor to mass participation, whereby the influence of 
education, urbanization, technology, industrialization and rising income increase the  
number of politically relevant members of society who seek to involve themselves in 
politics in order to protect themselves, their assets and the propensity for continued 
upward mobility. 21  
The notion that modernization via development consists of historical phases 
provides yet another avenue of debate as well as a series of variables and viewpoints on 
sequencing that will be studied in the proposed thesis. Phases themselves tend to be 
generally agreed upon in the wider literature yet the actual participation by individual 
countries within each phase is contested. Some view each phase as a requisite for 
continued progress while others believe that in the contemporary environment, a nation 
may skip stages along its individual path to modernity. Prominent examples are Rostow’s 
stages of growth and Gerschenkron’s counterpoint by way of explaining the divergent 
developmental trajectories of late developers as a result of “backwardness” and the vastly 
different exogenous and endogenous influences, along with the benefits achieved through 
technological transferability. 22 Przeworksi and Limongi describe modernization itself as  
the gradual differentiation and specialization of social structures that 
culminates in a separation of political structures from other structures and 
makes democracy possible. The specific causal chains consist of 
sequences of industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, 
mobilization, and political incorporation, among innumerable others: a 
progressive accumulation of social changes that ready a society to proceed 
to its culmination, democratization. 23  
                                                 
20 Ibid., 16. Huntington cites Lucian Pye in Communications and Political Development Princeton, 
1963.  
21 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 405-406. Huntington cites 
Karl Deutsch in, "Social Mobilization and Political Development." The American Political Science Review 
55, no. 3 (Sep., 1961): pp. 493-514. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952679.  
22 Walt W. Rostow, "The Stages of Economic Growth." In The Political Economy Reader: Markets as 
Institutions, 195--209. (New York and London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1960); Alexander 
Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective." In The Political Economy Reader: 
Markets as Institutions, 211. (New York and London: Routledge, 1962). 
23 Adam Przeworski,and Fernando Limongi. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." World Politics 49, 
no. 2 (Jan., 1997): pp. 155-183. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053996., 58. 
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Further, Przeworski and Limongi generalize the conditions for the fall of 
dictatorships and the transformation to democratic ideals as a process of economic 
development that brings with it increasingly complex social structures, organization and 
mobilization of labor, which successfully challenge command authority. Technological 
change provides direct producers with autonomy and private information, civil society 
emerges, and the masses eventually topple an increasingly opposed, ineffective dictatorial 
regime. 24 Thus, political, social and economic forces begin to combine, a country 
demonstrates the interactive process of these fields, and elements of modernization 
become increasingly evident. 
Daniel Lerner settles upon four basic yet functionally interdependent elements of 
modernization.25 In his study in the early 1950s, these dependent variables were 
annotated as urbanization, literacy, media participation and political participation. Lerner 
identifies democracy as a development of the latter stages yet again there is a general 
phasing to his variables, though literacy and media participation are combined. The 
pattern generally conforms to the establishment of cities to set the conditions for modern 
industrial society followed by the reciprocal relationship between literacy and media 
participation. In this phase, the two variables feed off of each other, though literacy is 
obviously the critical element. Then, when industrial development has progressed 
sufficiently, a society will compound its educational and technological gains by increased 
political participation via the production of newspapers, radio networks and motion 
pictures. These mark an advanced modern society by way of a political institution that 
provides for critique and mass participation.  
Karl Polanyi, a central figure in the school of economic sociology conceptualizes 
economics as founded upon relationships between economics and society, inherently 
interconnected spheres of a system. He espouses the “double movement” as social and 
state forces react via market intervention to protect the people when free market 
economic catalysts alter the balance of this interdependent system. While Polanyi states 
                                                 
24 Adam Przeworski,and Fernando Limongi. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." World Politics 49, 
no. 2 (Jan., 1997): pp. 155-183. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053996., 157. 
25 Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 82. Lipset cites Daniel Lerner in The Passage of 
Traditional Society (Glencoe Free Press, 1958). 
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that the economic system is a “mere function of social organization,” he, like Huntington, 
highlights the negative effect of uneven progress due to excessive speed. 26 “A process of 
undirected change, the pace of which is deemed too fast, should be slowed down, if 
possible, so as to safeguard the welfare of the community.” 27 The protective 
countermovement acts as an inhibitor to lopsided development and maintains the balance 
of the system by protecting the welfare of the masses. 28 Polanyi takes particular interest 
in the explanation of the nature and history of markets as well as their functioning and 
regulation from a social perspective. In this context, the pivotal relationship between 
economics and social forces is unveiled. As Karl Deustch points out, industrialization and 
rising income become critical contributors to social mobilization.  
Building on a societal perspective, Diamond, et al., identify a large middle class, 
bourgeoisie and the organized working class as the social results of economic 
development and key players in the democratization process. Specifically, technical and 
white collar workers, writers, professors, journalists, lawyers, and religious leaders 
constitute the critical middle class and intellectual leadership for civil society 
movements.29 Though the greater topic within this work is the impact of Christianity in 
east Africa, James Giblin touches upon a social consequence of industrialization in 
response to migrant labor in SSA. Giblin explains the concerns of Bena paramount, Chief 
Joseph Mbeyela with the collapse of the family unit and struggles to define one’s 
“family” in the Ulanga Valley, Njombe, Tanzania. The social cost of absentee men, 
which formed a migrant labor force for the Copperbelt in northern Zambia, tobacco farms 
in Zimbabwe and gold mines of South Africa, was divorce, adultery, desertion and 
abandonment of wives by these migrant laborers. The realities of migrant labor’s effects 
forced authorities to respond to social challenges. In this case, Mbeyela advocated 
                                                 
26 Karl Polanyi, "The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time." In The 
Political Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, 121. (London and New York: Routledge, 1944), 132.  
27 Karl Polanyi, "The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time." In The 
Political Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, 121. (London and New York: Routledge, 1944), 122. 
28 Ibid., 117. 
29 Larry Diamond. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, edited by 
Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien. (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), xxxiii and xxxiv. 
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changes in cultural trends that would decrease the need or desire to take up migrant work 
and therefor strengthen marriages, family stability and “tribal cohesion.”  Challenges 
surrounding the size and breadth of familiar responsibility for bridewealth, the forcing of 
women into unwanted marriages and acceptable terms for divorce led to the alignment  
with Christian marital ideals as well as motivations for increased education and health 
care as Chief Mbeyela struggled with the evolution of social, economic and cultural 
norms. 30 
Additionally, John Walton cites W. Moore’s 1965 volume, The Impact of 
Industry in order to draw attention to what Moore summarizes as “first order 
consequences of industrialization.” 31 Among these consequences of economic growth 
are productive organizations with technologically determined and functionally specific 
work relationships, pyramid structured administrative hierarchies of rational authority, a 
labor force relocating both from rural to urban dwellings and from the primary sector to 
other sectors of the economy, and eventually over-urbanized cities. Moore goes on to 
identify specific “reverberations” such as the rising predominance of the nuclear family, 
urban social disorganization, shifting primary determinants of status to occupation, skill 
and economic criteria. Nicholas Cope asserts a drastic difference in Zulu social history 
between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries as a result of increasing land hunger, 
rural poverty, accelerating labor migration, rising acculturation to ‘modern’ values, and 
the declining influence of local tribal authorities or employers via labor tenancy 
contracts. He claims that a complete schism from pre-industrial tradition did not occur, 
rather a new social reality emerged by way of the adaptation of new social divisions and 
ideas that restructured the class character of Zulu society. A key contributor to the 
swelling ranks of the petit bourgeois or South African middle class was the inseparable 
link between Christianity, education, the industrial model and civilization. 32  
                                                 
30 James Giblin, "Family Life, Indigenous Culture & Christianity in Colonial Njombe." In East 
African Expressions of Christianity, edited by Thomas Spear and Isaria A. Kimambo, 309, (Oxford: James 
Currey), 312-314.  
31 John Walton. "Theory and Research on Industrialization." Annual Review of Sociology 13, (1987): 
pp. 89-108. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2083241., 92. 
32 Cope, "The Zulu Petit Bourgeoisie and Zulu Nationalism in the 1920s: Origins of Inkatha," 434.  
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Initial attempts at democratization in the wake of decolonization were heralded as 
landmarks in African development. Later, the third wave of democratization swept the 
global landscape as over sixty nations adopted democratic practices. 33 However, as 
Michael Crowder notes, the resultant violence, poverty, misgovernment, weak state 
structures, and destructive economic and legal practices are the legacy of colonial 
powers. Colonial techniques served as a baseline example and fundamental shaping tool 
for post-colonial social, political and economic practices. 34 In his view, liberal 
democracy along the lines of the Westminster style was more the dream of the British 
than the Africans. 35 It is not surprising that current political, social and economic 
structures demonstrate a blend of autocratic and democratic methods. Richard Joseph 
defines “a political system as democratic to the extent that it facilitates citizen self-rule, 
permits the broadest deliberation in determining public policy, and constitutionally 
guarantees all the freedoms necessary for open political competition.” 36 The elements 
Joseph refers to in this definition encompass a sufficient snapshot of democracy for the 
Sub-Saharan African experience because insufficiencies in these areas largely 
characterize the present situation.  
Robert Dahl offers two key points of for consideration. First, he suggests three 
possible paths for democratization, a common Western sequence, an authoritarian-
modernization sequence, and a mutually reinforcing, incremental economic, social and 
political development sequence. 37 Second, is his recognition of the difficulties 
comparing causation for a particular political culture in different countries. In his list of  
                                                 
33 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.  
34 Michael Crowder, "Whose Dream was it Anyway? Twenty-Five Years of African Independence." 
African Affairs 86, (1987): 7—24., pp. 11-18.  
35 Ibid., 11. 
36 Richard Joseph, "Democratization in Africa After 1989." Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (1997): 
363--382., 365. 
37 Robert Dahl, "Development and Democratic Culture." In Consolidating the Third Wave 
Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, edited by Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-
mao Tien, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997),  34, 36-37. 
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six conclusions, the fifth acknowledges the concern that “no two countries have identical 
historical experiences, it is unreasonable to suppose that all democratic countries will 
possess identical political cultures.” 38  
Clearly there is a tremendous amount of literature highlighting the ‘African 
disaster.’ 39 However, the literature isn’t completely negative. Part of Michael Crowder’s 
argument is that the very survival of African states is an economic and political miracle 
in and of itself. 40 Stephen Radelet goes further and asserts that there are 17 “emerging” 
countries distancing themselves from peer nations on the continent. 41 Radelet believes 
that these states share five common major changes that help account for their overall 
success. The first is trending toward more democratic and accountable governments. 
Second is a shift towards more sensible economic policies. The third encompasses the 
end of debt crises and the establishment of better international relationships. Fourth is the 
spread of new technologies. The fifth and final is the emergence of a new generation of 
political, economic and social leaders. On the other hand, Radelet highlights several key 
challenges to the sustainability of recent success. Among them are challenges to 
deepening democracy, strengthening governance and creating new economic 
opportunities for a growing workforce via diversifying economies beyond subsistence 
agriculture and raw materials exploitation. 42 He views this diversification as crucial. 
“Without more diversified economic opportunities [such as food processing, clothing, 
jewelry, toys, furniture, etc.], economic growth and poverty reduction will almost 
certainly stall eventually.” 43 Further, he asserts, “throughout history around the world, 
this “structural transformation” from raw materials into diversified production is the sine 
qua non of sustained economic development.” 44 
                                                 
38 Ibid., pg. 38. 
39 Robert Dahl, "Development and Democratic Culture," pg. 10. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Steven Radelet, Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way. (Washington, D.C.: 
Center For Global Development, 2010). 
42 Radelet, Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way, 142-147. 
43 Ibid., 145.  
44 Ibid., 146. 
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Socio-economic and political development dominate the conversation on 
modernization. Authors and experts disagree on the causation and correlation of multiple 
variables in the emergence or longevity of a particular political regime. They also 
disagree on the bundling of economic development, social mobilization and democracy in 
the modernization theory at large. However, in unison, the field espouses the need for 
economic development in order to emerge from the limits of traditional, largely 
agriculture-based economies via diversification and industrialization. Alongside 
industrialization, social change is inevitable. A mobile labor force, investments in more 
efficient modes of production, the operations of profit-minded business and the 
enforcement of their related contracts churn the social, economic and political arenas. 
This functionally interactive process is the impetus for movement along the path of 
development. With economic development and industrialization comes among other 
things, a shift in class structure via the increase or decrease of working, middle and elite 
classes, urbanization, advances in technology, communication, electric power production, 
skills and education, social mobilization and the requirement for a state to respond in the 
form of providing public goods such as security, health, sanitation, legal accountability 
and infrastructure.  
It is at this intersection in the modernization, development, social, political and 
economic fields that this research is located. The causal sequencing of the various 
components of modernity is the prevailing disagreement. This research seeks to explore, 
in particular, industrialization and democratization as critical sequential elements in the 
context of contemporary Sub-Saharan African development. This thesis lies between the 
consensus view that economic growth via diversification and industrialization is a 
requisite for development, access to the global economy, modernization in general and 
the disputed notion of the teleological certainty of democracy, acquiescence to single 
historical paths of development and the achievement of Western liberal democratic 
characteristics. It is interested in examining within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
relationship between the political, social and economic results of industrialization and 
Lipset’s social requisites of democracy. 
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II. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION AS 
VARIABLES 
While there are many endogenous and exogenous influences upon a given 
country’s policies such as the availability of natural resources, war, foreign aid, or 
colonial imposition etc., this research will focus upon the critical outcomes of 
industrialization that coincide with predefined social requisites of democracy. It is less 
important what variables sparked or shaped individual industrial advancements and more 
important what characteristics have emerged as outcomes of a particular pattern of 
industrialization. It is anticipated that this research will show that industrialization, in 
particular its effects on the critical actors within the political economy of a nation, shapes 
the conditions for the emergence and sustainment of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Critical actors within the industrial complex, population and government share a special 
relationship that when balanced in terms of power, capacity and influence, drive a 
particular pattern of democratization.  
The framework for the analysis of the relationship between industrialization and 
democratization within the Sub-Saharan African context will align to key works provided 
by research conducted by Eva Bellin and Seymour Martin Lipset. Bellin provides her 
“contingency theory” that assists in defining measurable variables that contribute to what 
can be considered the actual mechanism between industry’s political, social and 
economic effects and the emergence of democracy. This mechanism is the establishment 
of conditions under which capital, labor and the state are more or less likely to favor 
democracy. “Enthusiasm” for democracy amongst the major players within the social, 
economic and political arena, namely private entrepreneurs, the labor force and the state/ 
political elites acts as the catalyst for the emergence of democratic momentum.45 
Determining the level of enthusiasm for democratization effectively analyzes the major  
                                                 
45 Eva Bellin. "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing 
Countries." World Politics 52, no. 2 (Jan., 2000): pp. 175-205. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054108. pg. 
178. 
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players’ relationships and the incentives to embrace democratic reform. This assumes a 
starting regime type as non-democratic in nature yet in Sub-Saharan Africa, this is not 
always the case.  
My analysis is bookended via Lipset’s research on the social requisites for 
democracy. He does not assume nor guarantee the emergence or sustainment of 
democracy. Lispet merely states that there are certain key elements that are common to 
facilitating or contributing to democracy. Democracy is a possible consequence of certain 
conditions.46 In this context, an open class system, capitalist economy, economic wealth, 
an egalitarian value system, literacy and high participation in voluntary organizations are 
the prevalent conditions in democratic systems.47 They are necessary but not sufficient 
for the emergence and sustainment of democracy. Lipset’s key requisites, while social in 
description within his work, clearly align to the political and economic as well. An open 
class system is one in which social hierarchies are defined by individual effort and 
achievement. An egalitarian value system is a pervasive, popular idea or social norm 
where a population views itself as a single entity, differences are minimized and all 
members are considered equal. A capitalist economy is one largely defined as free market 
in nature with minimal regulation and a business environment conducive for competition 
and profit maximization. Economic wealth refers to the ability to build and expend 
capital and is commonly measured by gross national income per capita and gross 
domestic product. Literacy is a function of educational opportunity and quality such that 
people may communicate and acquire the skills necessary to be of service or productive 
within an economy. High participation in voluntary organizations is a means to mobilize, 
interact, share ideas, debate and participate in governance at multiple levels.    
A. WHY INDUSTRIALIZATION? 
It is not the intention of this work to offer industrialization as a panacea for the 
many challenges that face Sub-Saharan African nations in the modern age. It is simply an 
entry point to the greater discussion concerning economic growth and stagnation as a late 
                                                 
46 Seymour Martin Lipset. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." American Political Science 
Review 53, no. 1 (1959): pg. 103.  
47 Ibid., pg. 105. 
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developing region and serves as a key contributor to conditions that influence democracy 
in general. Industrial capacity serves as a hallmark of the “developed” world. It is a key 
element in “modern” national capacity and critical contributor to economic development. 
The advancement of material interests opens the door for continued opportunity, social 
and economic mobility and is a catalyst for eventual endogenous growth. This type of 
growth is a cycle of self-sustaining development where income is generated by 
technological innovation, which raises national income and stimulates further innovation 
in a positive feedback process.48 Jeffrey Sachs asserts that an endogenous growth pattern 
is the aim point for actors within the global economy and has largely been achieved by 
the industrialized, advanced economies of the world. In descending order from 
endogenous growth, other patterns include catch-up growth, resource-based growth, 
Malthusian decline and economic isolation. It is within these classifications that many 
Sub-Saharan African countries reside. In fact, Sachs asserts that the majority of Sub-
Saharan African countries fall into the categories of resource-based growth and 
Malthusian decline.49 Resource-based patterns are characterized by per capita incomes 
within an economy that are subject to the extreme volatility of resource booms and busts 
while those classified as in Malthusian decline “experience a process of falling per capita 
income caused by population pressures outstripping the carrying capacity of the local 
economy, in circumstances in which the country is neither innovating nor successfully 
adopting technology from abroad.” 50 These classifications denote undiversified 
economies with few economic alternatives to sustain their economies and an inability to 
adopt much less diffuse technology. Such characteristics define a weak economy that at 
best will remain stagnant, and at worst, decline relative to global competitors and show 
very little potential to catch up to the modern world.  
Strong economies exhibit the economic power, multi-sector capacity and financial 
security that allow them to shape and drive their interaction within the international 
                                                 
48 Jeffrey D. Sachs. "Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development." Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv 136, no. 4 (2000): 579–599. pg. 581. 
49 Ibid., pg. 583. 
50 Ibid., pg. 581–582. 
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community. According to the IMF World Economic Outlook 2011, several advanced 
economies include the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, Canada 
and Japan.51 A review of World Bank 2011 data shows the average sector ratios as a 
percentage of GDP for these “advanced economies” to be approximately 2% Agriculture, 
29% Industry (16% of which is a result of manufacturing), 69% Services. Sub-Saharan 
African economies on average demonstrate a ratio of 24%: 29% (9%): 47%.52 (See Table 
1. Also, See Table 15. And Figure 5.) Weak economies tend towards reliance upon a 
single or few commodities that place a government and population at the mercy of boom 
and bust economic cycles. The key item of note is a heavier reliance upon agriculture and 
smaller manufacturing capability. This comparison generally highlights the trend that 
increases in the industrial and related service sectors are a mark of the advanced 
economic world. Diversification has a modernizing effect through occupational 
specialization, urbanization and the potential for expanded access to education and 
technology. These modernizing elements are also key contributors to democratization.53  
 
Table 1.   Service Sectors by Contribution to GDP (From 52) 
The industrialization of a country provides economic diversification that 
generates increased opportunities beyond the limits of subsistence agriculture or other 
single commodity reliance. It serves as a vehicle for social and economic change closely 
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linked to development, poverty reduction and increased income at the individual, regional 
and national levels. On the surface, a capital-intensive mode of development that 
translates into mass inclusion of the population and the protection of economic and social 
gain is more likely to trend towards democracy. Looking deeper, industrialization 
provides the forum for social and economic mobilization responsible for the conditions in 
which democratic governance is a viable option. It can also act as a means to increase 
domestic and foreign investor confidence in the methods of governance, stability, 
regulation and accountability for making and securing profits within developing nations. 
Additionally, the industrial sector provides a key opportunity to enhance total factor 
productivity, innovation and outputs for export-led development. It ultimately provides 
the impetus to catapult SSA countries beyond the “third world.”  
B. WHY DEMOCRATIZATION? 
Variant degrees of democracy or its nemesis, autocracy span the globe and drive 
the manner in which countries are governed and participate in the global community. 
There are several rationales for the promotion of democratic ideals each of which are 
controversial in their own right yet nevertheless utilized in common governance 
discourse. Democratic peace, for example espouses the argument that democracies almost 
never fight each other because of shared ideologies, mass popular inclusion in the 
political process and the sense that conflict can be resolved in alternate ways.54 The 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 witnessed the virtual triumph of capitalism and 
liberal democracy over communism and socialist governance. This event bolstered the 
validity of “the Western idea” and emboldened its supporters around the world. 
Fukuyama went so far as to suggest that the world might have witnessed not just the end 
of the Cold War, but also “the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”55 
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Fittingly, democracy is a highly visible element within the foreign policy and 
strategy of the United States, the West and International Finance Institutions. According 
to the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, effective democracy provides a 
deterrent to the roots of terrorist activity, the countering of which is a mainstay of U.S. 
Foreign Policy in Africa. In this view, democracy offers an ownership stake in society, 
the ability to shape one’s own future, rule of law, peaceful resolution of disputes, the 
opportunity to advance interests via compromise, respect for human dignity, freedom of 
speech and independent media.56 It is common knowledge that certain restrictions in the 
form of sanctions or benefits via increased aid and trade agreements accompany political 
reform in the direction of liberal democratic ideals. The United States, along with many 
other nations have increased engagement on the African continent. Though potentially 
“episodic” in comparison to humanitarian assistance or counterterrorism themes, 
supporting democratization efforts is a definitive aspect of United States-African Foreign 
Policy.57 This is in stark contrast to the mythical “no strings attached” policy exercised 
by the Chinese government that emphasizes business opportunities and political leanings 
on Taiwan but neglects domestic political democratic reform milestones.58 As it stands 
within the international relations and policy world, foreign investment and aid programs 
represent key, controversial inputs to the economic growth and development of recipient 
nations as well as the nature of their economies and political structures.  
Przeworski and Limongi tackle the empirical relationship between economic 
development and democracy. They suggest a “sweet spot” for democratic transition from 
authoritarian regimes in terms of per capita income. In a 1997 study, Przeworski and 
Limongi found that dictatorships become less stable as incomes rise beyond $1,000, 
which introduces the potential for a transition to democracy. However, once incomes rise 
beyond $5,000 to $6,000, the momentum swings in favor of dictatorial consolidation 
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rather than democratization if democracy has failed to emerge.59 The critical watermark 
is estimated to be a per capita income of $4,155. An interesting note was the insistence 
that beyond the $6,000 per capita income mark, a country that had transitioned to 
democracy during that key period was almost certain to remain democratic indefinitely.60 
Economic growth and rising per capita income do not fully explain democratic 
emergence. Therefore, it is useful to measure the extent to which the $4,155 threshold 
holds true within the Sub-Saharan African context as an additional input to assessing 
prospects for democracy in the region. 
The undeniable reality is that democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa can be 
generalized as a rapid and incomplete transition. Socio-economically underdeveloped and 
relatively authoritarian states that struggle to control ethnically diverse populations, weak 
institutions that fail to effectively regulate and hold actors accountable, widespread 
reliance upon political clientelism and patrimonial networks and a relative lack of popular 
trust and faith in governance affect the make-up and functioning of electoral regimes on 
the continent.61 This is to say that there is considerable variance with respect to the levels 
of democracy or autocracy within Sub-Saharan Africa. Not all Sub-Saharan African 
countries are struggling yet conversely, not all are thriving from a social, political or 
economic perspective. Considering that democracy sits at the center of an event such as 
the collapse of the Soviet model, the exceedingly powerful and capable foreign policies 
of the United States and its allies, the rising competition of Chinese influence on the 
African continent, and the implication that certain economic or social thresholds can 
assist in predicting the emergence or sustainment of certain governance types, democracy 
proves to be a critical topic for discussion. 
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C. THE CASE STUDIES 
Industrialization and democratization, separately and together, transform the 
political, social and economic arenas. Each is a result of the specific policies of an 
individual country. Industrial and democratic trends highlight the ability of Sub Saharan  
African countries to circumvent international marginalization, redefine themselves as 
equal partners and establish legitimacy in the eyes of the global community despite the 
international competition that surrounds their development.  
Assuming that as a function of national sovereignty, any individual nation 
chooses and implements its own policies, it can be expected that cross-nationally, 
patterns of industrialization and democratization will be unique. However, specific 
patterns of industrialization will produce variant results and consequences that affect the 
patterns of democracy and potentially assist in the explanation of divergent 
developmental trajectories as well as provide indications of more generalizable patterns 
across countries. The relationships between labor, entrepreneurs and the state measured 
in terms of dependency and incentives provide an effective view of how, why or to what 
level democracy has taken hold in a given country. If labor or private capitalists are 
independent of the state and have the capacity to exert bargaining influence, the state will 
be more apt to negotiate increasingly democratic characteristics in order to continue 
growth or at a minimum maintain the status quo. If labor or private capitalists are heavily 
dependent on the state, they have little incentive to “rock the boat” or “bite the hand that 
feeds it” by pressing for increased checks and balances within the processes of 
governance. The following case studies will assist in understanding what has actually 
occurred within selected countries with different industrial performance levels by taking 
a detailed look the nature of the critical three-way relationship between labor, private 
capitalists and the state.  
For the purposes of establishing a starting point to this analysis, the countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa were organized according to industrial capacity. This total capacity is 
measured in terms of % GDP value added for industry (industrial productivity). Data was 
collected from the most recent available World Bank information. Industry, in this data 
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set, “corresponds to ISIC divisions 10–45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 
15–37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, 
water, and gas.”62 The set was then broken down into high, medium and low industrial 
productivity sub-groups as well as placed, roughly, into one of four geographical regions, 
west, central, southern and eastern nations. In the interest of brevity, South Africa and 
Gabon were selected as high performers, Senegal as a middle performer and Burundi as a 
low performer. These cases present a generalizable snapshot of the divergent nature of 
industrialization and democratization patterns on the continent. 
Each case study will be organized in a manner that first examines the basic 
historical democratization experience. Second, I will provide an economic and industrial 
capacity snapshot of each country. Third, I will discuss the appropriate placement within 
certain stages of modernity according to models provided by Walt Rostow, Jefferey 
Sachs and Michael Porter. Fourth, I will analyze the country-specific relationships 
between three key actors: private sector capitalists/ entrepreneurs, labor and the state/ 
political elites. This analysis will then assess the balance inherent to the political 
economy of the selected country. The balance will be addressed in terms of relative 
dependence or independence in line with the analysis provided by Bellin’s “contingent 
democrat” theory. Finally, I will examine and provide an assessment as to how the 
industrial characteristics contribute to Lipset’s social requisites.  
                                                 
62 "The World Bank: Working for a World Free of Poverty." Accessed November 29, 2011, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator?display=graph. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up 
all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation 
of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
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III. HIGH PERFORMERS—SOUTH AFRICA AND GABON 
South Africa and Gabon are the first two case studies. Although each is a high 
industrial performer, these two countries provide drastically different examples of overall 
industrial capacity and democratic characteristics. South Africa, despite its exploitation of 
mineral deposits, is a much more diversified economy, whose characteristics contribute 
differently to democratic requisites than that of Gabon, whose economy is completely 
dominated by petroleum. The resulting patterns of democratization and current political 
and economic situations serve to help us understand the relationship between 
industrialization and democratization within the broader Sub-Saharan Africa region. The 
availability and utilization of minerals, gas or hydrocarbons as national revenue 
generators contribute significantly and divergently to the political economies and social 
structures on the continent.    
A. SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa represents a high industrial performance country and illustrates an 
example of a southern region country with a diverse, relatively balanced economy and 
long history of democratic governance. 
1. Pattern of Democracy 
The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 from British colonies and Dutch 
settlers known as the Boers. Apartheid was instituted in 1948 alongside the voting in of 
the National Party. A republic was declared in 1961 and later majority and multi-racial 
rule in 1994 when the African National Congress came to power. South Africa’s polity 
IV index demonstrates a stable and durable democracy from independence in 1910 
through to 1991 and increasing further to the present day.63 (See Figure 1. Also, See 
Table 16. And Figure 6.) This increase corresponds to the 1991 abolishment of remaining 
apartheid legislation, a new constitution in 1993 and elections in 1994 resulting in a new 
                                                 
63 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions 
Datasets. Polity IV: Annual Time-Series 1800-2010. 2010. Polity IV 2010; Polity 2 composite score of 4 
until 1991, 6 in 1992, 8 in 1993, 9 in 1994 and beyond. 
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President, Nelson Mandela.64 Recent political events include the resignation of President 
Mbeki in 2008, followed briefly by the ANC General Secretary as interim president until 
the election of President Zuma in 2009.65 Of particular note is the fact that the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions, the South African Communist Party, and the South 
African National Civics Organization represent viable entities of political pressure within 
the South African political system.66 This is important because is represents a rare Sub-
Saharan African instance of formal, large scale labor force mobilization as a formidable 
player within the political scene.  
 
Figure 1.   South Africa Polity IV data (Polity 2 Subset; From 63) 
2. Economic Snapshot and Industrial Capacity 
The South African economy is diverse and comprised of a sector breakdown by 
contribution to GDP of 3% agriculture, 31% industry, 15% of which is manufacturing, 
and 66% services.67 (See Table 2. Also, See Table 15. And Figure 5.) This is remarkably 
similar to the sector ratio averages of the advanced economies previously noted. South 
                                                 
64 "The U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action. Background Note: South Africa." Accessed 
December 1, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2898.htm. In 1991, the Group Areas Act, Land Acts, 
and the Population Registration Act--the last of the so-called "pillars of apartheid" were abolished. 
65 "Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook." Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. South Africa. 
66 "Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook." Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. South Africa. 
67 "The World Bank: Working for a World Free of Poverty." Accessed November 29, 2011, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator?display=graph.  
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Africa possesses plentiful natural resources and as of 2010 does more export selling than 
import buying. Uniquely, South Africa also manufactures fuel from coal, which it 
produces. GDP per capita surpassed $1,000 in 1973, and the $4,155 mark in 2004. It 









Agriculture  2%  24%  3% 
Industry  29%  29%  31% 
Manufacturing  16%  9%  15% 
Services  69%  47%  66% 
Table 2.   Service Sectors by Contribution to GDP (From 52) 
3. Modernity Assessment 
Within the context of economic development and modernity, South Africa can be 
considered a country with above average development and a competitor within the global 
economy. From a communications, connectivity and electrical production perspective, 
South Africa is one of the most modern countries on the continent. It produces 
considerably more electricity than it consumes and even exports 14.05 billion kWh 
annually.69 Its communications system is nearly state of the art and the combined fixed 
and mobile phone teledensity is estimated at 110 phones to every 100 people.70 South 
Africa also ranks 21st in the world for Internet hosts and 54th in Internet users. Its 
economy is diversified across the major sectors and manufacturing makes up 15% of the 
industrial base with agriculture comprising a mere 3% of GDP. Such diversification 
alleviates the volatility of single commodity or agriculture heavy exports as a main 
                                                 
68 "The World Bank: Working for a World Free of Poverty." Accessed November 29, 2011, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator?display=graph. 
69 “Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook," Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. South Africa. Actual measured 
production of electricity is 238.3 billion kWh and consumption is approximately 212.2 billion kWh. 
70 Ibid. The communications network utilizes open-wire, coaxial, microwave, fiber-optics, radio 
telephone and wireless technologies. 
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source of national income. South Africa is not without domestic challenges in terms of 
economic or social indicators such as unemployment, degrading infrastructure or poverty 
rates. However, it is well developed in terms of sustainable capacity such that it is able to 
export abundant natural resources and utilize reliable financial, legal, communications, 
energy and transportation sectors.71 South Africa’s industrial exports capacity garners 
classification as a “catching up” country well on its way to achieving “endogenous 
growth” according to Jeffrey Sachs.72  South Africa likely straddles the line between an 
investment driven and innovation driven economy. The production of innovative 
products and services is not yet the dominant source of competitive advantage but South 
Africa is able to assimilate and improve upon foreign technologies and even export 
machinery and equipment.73 With respect to Rostow’s economic development scale, 
South Arica has clearly entered the “drive to maturity” stage having surpassed the 













Table 3.   Modernization Assessment South Africa (From 69) 
                                                 
71 “Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook," Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. South Africa. 
72 Sachs, Jeffrey D. "Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development." Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv 136, no. 4 (2000): 579-599. pg. 582.  
73 Porter, Michael E. Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: The Current 
Competitiveness Index- Business School Stage Theory Harvard Business School, 2002. pg. 8.; “Central 
Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook," Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. South Africa. 
74 Nafzinger, E. Wayne. Economic Development. 4th ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006. pg. 129.  
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4. The Critical Relationship 
Overall, the business environment of South Africa is conducive to establishing 
and maintaining business yet has its challenges. Governmental regulations are slightly 
burdensome, access to bank loans and venture capital is slightly difficult to access and 
incidences of crime and violence impose significant costs on business.75 The Index of 
Economic Freedom ranks South Africa at 74th in the world and asserts that “monetary 
stability is relatively strong but the government influences prices through regulation, 
state-owned enterprises, and other support programs. The lack of regulatory transparency 
still hinders investment. The legal environment is inefficient but relatively free from 
political interference and the threat of expropriation.”76 Legal protections for borrower 
and lender rights is excellent and the International Finance Corporation, World Bank 
Group ranks South Africa in the top 20% of easiest countries in the world to do 
business.77  Within Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa averaged a 7 of 53 ranking between 
2000 and 2010 on the Ibrahim Index for Sustainable Economic Opportunity. This index 
takes into account public management, the business environment and infrastructure 
among other variables.78 
South Africa has one of the better corruption classifications on the continent and 
is designated at the virtual midpoint between highly corrupt and highly clean. 79 There is 
a prevalent notion that strong favoritism exists in the implementation of policies or 
awarding of contracts to well-connected firms or individuals yet this is not considered 
                                                 
75 World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011, 2011. pg. 181. Indicator 1.09- Governmental Regulation burden 3 of 7; 
Indicator 8.04- Access to bank loans difficulty 3.2 of 7; Indicator 8.05- Venture Capital access difficulty 3 
of 7; Indicator 1.14-Cost of crime and violence on business 2.1 of 7.  
76 The Heritage Foundation. "2011 Index of Economic Freedom: South Africa." Accessed December 
1, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/SouthAfrica.  
77 World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011, 2011. pg. 181. Indicator 8.06; 9 of 10 score. International Finance 
Corporation. "Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations." , accessed December 1, 2011, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/south-africa.  
78 Mo Ibrahim Foundation. The 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2011.  
79 Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2010." Accessed November 29, 2011, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. Corruption score- 4.5 of 10. 
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severe.80 In this case, the relationship between the state and private capitalists begins on a 
relatively even playing field. However, tariff rates offset the burden of a 40% income tax 
rate and 28% corporate tax rate. The average industrial tariff is 4.95 % on imports. Key 
industrial imports such as textiles and manufactures face very high tariffs of 36.8% and 
24.7% respectively. Lower tariffs exist on technology imports such as machinery, 2.14% 
and other scientific instruments, .21%.81 (See Table 19. And Figure 7.) Combined, this 
overall tariff structure demonstrates a state that provides a comfortable and competitive 
environment for domestic industry as well as maximizes the ability to import and diffuse 
technology. This is a win-win situation for government and industry and illustrates a 
strong incentive to maintain the political status quo so as not to “rock the boat.” In a 
country like South Africa, where democracy is prevalent and consolidated over a long 
period of time, this reality bodes particularly well for continued democratic durability and 
steady yet subtle pressure to maintain democratic governance. 
The trade union situation in South Africa is significant and truly exceptional 
within Sub-Saharan Africa. Unions provide the key mechanism for the labor force to 
organize, mobilize and collectively assert pressure on both private capitalist business 
leadership as well as the state. In South Africa, COSATU (Congress of the South African 
Trade Unions) unifies over 21 trade unions that span all sectors of the economy with 
approximately 1.8 million members.82 These unions and their “Congress” exert 
extremely effective influence on employers and government. There are also other 
umbrella union organizations such as the Confederation of South African Worker’s 
Unions, the Federation of Unions of South Africa and the National Council of Trade 
Unions. Though employers retain the right to hire alternate workers during lockouts and 
the government at times has responded to strikes with heavy police intervention, union 
                                                 
80 World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011, 2011. Indicator 1.07, 2.6 of 7 score 
81 International Trade Center. "Market Access Map: Average Tariff Applied by Sector." International 
Trade Center, accessed December 1, 2011. 
http://www.macmap.org/Index.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fCountry.Analysis.Results.AverageMFN.aspx.  
82 United Nations. "International Labor Organization." Accessed December 1, 2011, 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest. 
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capacity and effectiveness remains extremely high.83 For example, in 2007 and 2008 
metalworkers, mineworkers, textile, coal and gold production sectors pressed for and won 
concessions for pay raises beyond inflation rates as well as prevented layoffs due to the 
electricity distribution crises at the time.84 To take it yet another step forward, COSATU 
is part of a political alliance with the African National Congress, which avails 
unprecedented political power for organized labor in the region. 
Income inequality is severe in South Africa, which represents a source of social 
stratification and acts as a potential grievance to influence the political and business 
spheres. The income share going to the highest 20% of the population is 72.2% while 
only 2.5% resides with the lowest 20%. This is potentially offset by an estimated 55% 
labor participation rate. However, at 24.9% unemployment and a poverty rate of 23%, the 
cumulative strain alongside such a deep income gap provides a labor force of 18.9 
million plenty of incentive to mobilize and pressure government for concessions. With an 
86.4% literacy rate, they also have the ability to intelligently do so.85 (See Table 20.) In 
addition, general consensus indicates the popular notion that pay is weakly related to 
productivity and unfair labor employee practices are relatively widespread.86 Based upon 
the prevalence and historical power of the labor unions, it is a logical conclusion that the 
labor force as a whole considers itself disconnected from the state and employers despite 
an alliance between the government and COSATU. The independently powerful nature of 
labor in South Africa creates an overall labor force that is confident in its ability to exert 
political influence. It remains in a strong position to continue its engagement with 
entrepreneurial and political elites so as to support the advancement of its own rights and  
                                                 
83 International Trade Union Confederation. "Annual Survey of Trade Union Violations." Accessed 
December 1, 2011, http://survey.ituc-csi.org/.  
84 Scott D. Taylor. "Labor Markets in Africa: Multiple Challenges, Limited Opportunities." Current 
History  (2009).  
85 "The World Bank: Working for a World Free of Poverty." Accessed November 29, 2011, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator?display=graph. "Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook." 
Accessed November 29, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html.  
86 World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011, 2011. pg. 180. Indicator 7.06, 3.2 of 7. 
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protections, transparency in the workplace and other democratic ideals. This contributes 
directly to the social requisites of literacy and high participation in voluntary 
organizations.  
Apartheid represents a key marker in the pattern of democratization within South 
Africa. It is particularly important for our purposes because its restrictive characteristics 
directly impact economic opportunity and distribution, education, employment, legal 
rights, political inclusion, popular mobilization, organization and social acceptance. 
Without question, apartheid is a critical meeting point for the state, labor, and private 
capitalists and provides key insight into the pressures and responses between the three 
and allows us a view of policies that shaped both industrial and democratic patterns. It 
therefor helps illustrate the relationship between the two. Though democratic governance 
existed prior to apartheid legislation, the democracy that existed before and during 
apartheid was clearly different post abolition in 1994. Similarly, industrial capacity, 
particularly in terms of labor power evolved considerably as well considering apartheid 
policies were intent on creating and consolidating a non-white, industrial working class. 
Apartheid was instituted in 1948 when the National Party came to power. It 
formally institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination through a series of legal 
acts aimed at solidifying white control and reclassifying societal roles.87 The many 
articles of legislation that followed rigidly defined and dictated, based upon color, the 
terms of purchasing or leasing land, marriage, residential separation, skilled labor 
training, forced resettlement, residential rights, citizenship and educational curriculum. 
These formal “acts” also directly affected the ability of non-whites to politically organize, 
access or achieve representation in Parliament, conduct labor strike actions, vote, receive 
a trial if detained or appeal to courts. Until its dissolution in 1994, apartheid effectively 
divided the South African population and dynamically altered the relationship between 
the state, labor and private capitalists. During this period, the state maintained a firm grip 
on controlling the balance of power, drove and funneled large numbers of blacks to the 
“reserves” or “homelands,” and vigorously pressed for a system of subservient, migratory 
                                                 
87 "The History of Apartheid in South Africa," Accessed April 1, 2012, http://www-cs-
students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html.  
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labor and a permanent industrial working class with a menial connection to white-
dominated urban cities. “Africans could not acquire industrial and capital assets in the 
modern economy, but they could work in it so long as they remained detachable and 
migratory.”88 The state even went so far as to pass legislation that attempted to capitalize 
and industrialize “homelands” in order to create employment in Bantu areas via the Bantu 
Investment Corporation Act of 1959, which would reinforce the seniority of the central 
government and keep non-whites out of urban centers.89 The 1980s brought gradual 
reform and removal of apartheid legislation. In 1994, with the election of Nelson 
Mandela and the transition to leadership from the National Party to the African National 
Congress (ANC), the ANC won majorities within Parliament and at the provincial level. 
While there has been deliberate liberalization of social and economic policies in the 
Government of National Unity, an uneasy transformation continues in a now post-
apartheid South Africa. 
In the case of South Africa, the relative power between the state, private 
capitalists and labor is basically balanced. The state is strong and relies upon democratic 
institutions for legitimacy and accountability. It provides a comfortable and profitable 
environment for private capitalists and has the ability to protect, hold accountable and 
influence business and labor. Industrial entrepreneurs are able to take advantage of the 
tariff structure, legal protections and overall positive business environment, turn a profit, 
employ a largely skilled workforce and contribute significantly to GDP. The 
diversification they provide is relied upon by the state to mitigate commodity price 
volatility and by labor for employment and organization. Labor in South Africa is highly 
organized, protected and able to exert effective influence on both business leaders and the 
political realm. They provide a reliable, sturdy backbone to a diversified economy and 
relatively stable democracy. This is perhaps highlighted by the imbalance that existed 
during the apartheid era whereas the arguably democratically elected state authorities 
                                                 
88 Madavo, Callisto E. "Government Policy and Economic Dualism in South Africa." Canadian 
Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 5, no. 1 (1971): pp. 19-32. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/484048. pg. 22 and 23. 
89 Cornell, Margaret. "The Statutory Background of Apartheid: A Chronological Survey of South 
African Legislation." The World Today 16, no. 5 (May, 1960): pp. 181-194. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40393230.  pg. 182. 
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implemented policies that reversed democratic ideals, suppressed the business 
environment and discriminated against the majority of the South African population. At 
the macro level, this balanced relationship helps us understand how characteristics of 
industrial capacity, such as a skilled, educated and organized workforce, economic 
diversification, capitalist methods, increased per capita and gross domestic revenue 
contribute to the stability or instability of the social, economic and political arenas.   
5. Analysis of Lipset’s Requisites  
Elements from within this case study apply to each element of my analysis of 
South Africa’s satisfaction of Lipset’s social requisites. Median levels of corruption, a 
large income gap, unemployment and popular notions of actual productivity having little 
to do with monetary compensation in the workforce shine a negative light on the 
openness of the class system or a pervasive egalitarian value system and detract from 
democratic characteristics. The apartheid era, also, is a critical contributor to these two 
social elements. Nearly a half-century of centrally institutionalized segregation is not 
easily undone. The dismantling of apartheid legislation throughout the 1980s and the 
1994 all-race elections officially leveled the playing field and now legitimately protect an 
open class system. A pervasive egalitarianism value system, though, remains a work in 
progress. However, a conducive business environment, the relative ease of doing business 
both domestically and internationally, regionally high per capita incomes and being 
ranked, on average, one of the top 7 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2001 in terms 
of sustainable economic opportunity demonstrates a functioning capitalist economy and 
the ability to build and expend economic wealth. Such sustained economic growth and 
development will likely go a long ways to consolidating a pervasive South African 
egalitarian value system. This assessment takes into consideration slightly obtrusive 
governmental regulation and difficulties gaining access to bank loans or venture capital. 
Without question, South Africa has exceedingly high participation in voluntary 
organizations due to the strength and prevalence of organized labor as well as its capacity 
and power within the political establishment. Arguably, apartheid era repression of the 
overwhelming majority of the labor force contributes to the post-apartheid strengthening 
of political power for organized labor, which is without peer on the continent. Despite the 
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discriminatory educational system under apartheid, South Africa has an 86.4% literacy 
rate. This ensures that the population may communicate and acquire the skills necessary 
to be of service or productive from a social, political or economic perspective. As the 
educational system adjusts to post-apartheid reforms, one must assume that the literacy 
rate will continue to grow and thus have an overall positive effect on the political 
economy. In sum, South Africa has partially satisfied the requisites for an open class 
system and pervasive egalitarianism. It has fully satisfied the requisites for economic 
wealth, a capitalist economy, high literacy and high participation in voluntary 












Table 4.   Satisfaction of Lipset’s Requisites & Bellin’s Balance- South Africa 
B. GABON 
Gabon is the second representative case study for the high-performing sub-group. 
It is a central African country with historically autocratic governance making a very 
recent transition to democracy whose industrial make-up is dominated by oil and mineral 
extraction over manufacturing. 
1. Pattern of Democracy 
Gabon has a stable history of autocracy since independence from France in 1960 
yet is now described as a democratic republic. Following independence, Gabon navigated 
a political process that witnessed the actual consolidation of two primary political parties 
down to one, a subsequent coup, which was immediately reversed by French intervention 
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and then the election in 1964 of Leon M’Ba of the Bloc Democratique Gabonais (BDG 
party).90 Upon President M’Ba’s death in 1967, El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba, came to 
power and ruled a one-party state until introducing multi-partyism in the early 1990s. 
Key milestones in the return path to multi-partyism were the dissolution of the BDG 
party and establishment of the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG), the April 1990 
political conference, which was a result of public demonstrations and introduced major 
democratic reforms, and the Paris Accords in 1994, also the result of civil disturbance.91 
The Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) dominates the political arena and maintains 
control over the National Assembly and Regional governments.92 Potentially fraudulent 
elections continued until Bongo’s death in 2009 when his son Ali Ben Bongo was elected 
with 42% of the vote. Two rival competitors achieved approximately 25% of the vote 
each. Of particular note, as per constitutional requirement, the president of the senate 
assumed control of the government upon the death of Bongo senior until elections could 
be held only a few months later. In Gabon, the president appoints the prime minister and 
provincial governors and there are no term limits on the presidency.93 Gabon’s polity IV 
scores mirror this snapshot. (See Figure 2. Also, See Table 16. And Figure 6.) They 
indicate a decreasingly autocratic form of governance stemming from 1990 that based 
upon the 2009 elections and constitutional adherence to power transition procedure 
turned positive for democratic measurement.94 However, these scores remain 
appropriately low considering the tumultuous nature of multi-partyism in Gabon, the 
dominance of the Bongo led PDG party and the influence of the executive down through 
the provinces. 
 
                                                 
90 "The U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action. Background Note: Gabon," Accessed April 9, 
2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2826.htm.  
91 Ibid.  
       92 U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State. Doing Business in Gabon: 2011 
Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies, 2011.  
93 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. "Gabon," Accessed April 9, 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gb.html#top.  
94 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions 




Figure 2.   Gabon Polity IV data (Polity 2 Subset; From 63) 
2. Economic Snapshot and Industrial Capacity 
The Gabonese economy is based largely upon oil whose revenues comprise 
roughly 46% of the government’s budget, 43% of gross domestic product, and 81% of 
exports.95 Economic sectors as contributors to GDP are 4% agriculture, 54% industrial, 
4% of which is considered manufacturing, and 42% services.96 (See Table 5. Also, See 
Table 15. And Figure 5.) Minerals and timber are also leading industries, although the 
overwhelming breadwinner is the petroleum sector despite decreasing production as of 
the late 1990s.97 The decrease in the production of oil has sparked domestic concerns 
over the extreme lack of economic diversity, generated state-led efforts to develop 
alternate sources for income as well as state-led streamlining of barriers to foreign 




                                                 
95 "The U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action. Background Note: Gabon," Accessed April 9, 
2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2826.htm.  
96 The World Bank. "Data Indicators: Gabon," Accessed April 10, 2012, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/gabon.  
       97 U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State. Doing Business in Gabon: 2011 










Table 5.   Service Sectors by Contribution to GDP (From 52) 
3. Modernity Assessment 
The political leadership of Gabon openly acknowledges the lopsided nature of the 
economy, poor infrastructure, average communications capacity, and the necessity for 
economic diversification through value added industrial development. President Bongo 
announced his economic plan though the “Gabon Emergent” initiative of 2009. In it, he 
proposed a three-pronged approach to modernize, emerge as an economic power by 2025 
and compete effectively in the global economy.98 President Bongo addresses the 
country’s current status as a primary producer, the limited petroleum reserves, and other 
constraints on its path to modernity. Gabon operates at a slight electricity surplus 
producing 1.963 billion kWh while consuming 1.6 billion kWh.99 A minimalist 
communications infrastructure lags behind peer African nations yet is sufficient for 
present needs. Only 10% of the population utilizes the Internet, which supports a global 
rank in terms of Internet use at 160th. Also, cell phone teledensity is estimated at a 1 to 1 
ratio.100 Gabon is clearly a “factor-driven” economy yet its large income provides the 
ability to move quickly into the “investment-driven” stage of development.101 Sachs 
                                                 
98 The Republic of Gabon Government. Gabon Emergent: 2009. Gabon: A Country of Opportunity. 
Libreville, Gabon: 2009. pg 3. 
99 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook. "Gabon," Accessed April 9, 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gb.html#top. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Michael E. Porter. Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: The Current 








Agriculture  2%  24%  4% 
Industry  29%  29%  54% 
Manufacturing  16%  9%  4% 
Services  69%  47%  42% 
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would classify Gabon as a “resource-based grower” or “primary producer.”102 By 
Rostow’s classification, Gabon rests firmly in the “pre-conditions” stage. (See Table 6. 
And Table 17.) However, such conditions seem to be moving into place as the limitations 
on oil have provided a catalyst for state and political elites to actively pursue economic 
development. This can be expected to contribute significantly to overcoming the many 
barriers to steady growth and quite possibly have a unifying effect on the nation as they 
collectively work to battle such a formidable economic challenge. 
                                                 
102 Jeffrey D. Sachs. "Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development." Weltwirtschaftliches 















Table 6.   Modernization Assessment Gabon (From 99) 
4. The Critical Relationship 
Gabon can be considered an upper-middle income country with a per capita GDP 
measured at approximately $7,760 whose business environment is quite challenging for 
entrepreneurs.103 It is not conducive to investment or profit maximization for either 
domestic or international companies unrelated to the oil related sector. Because so little 
domestic capacity exists, Gabon is virtually reliant upon foreign companies to extract and 
exploit its petroleum resources. Also, as Gabon struggles with its lack of economic 
diversity, it must reach out to the international world for much needed investment. 
“Diversification attempts have been largely unsuccessful due to high labor costs, non-
tariff trade barriers, corruption, lack of skilled labor and entrepreneurial experience.”104 
Gabon’s vulnerability leads to increased opportunities for foreign investment as it strives 
to expand offshore oil exploration, for which it eased licensing requirements 2010, iron 
ore mining, wood-based manufacturing, palm oil processing and telecommunications.105 
Unfortunately, the IFC ranks Gabon 156th of 183 countries in terms of ease of doing 
                                                 
103 The World Bank. "Data Indicators: Gabon," Accessed April 10, 2012, 
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104 U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State. Doing Business in Gabon: 
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business. Gabon declined in 6 of 10 individual indicators from 2011 yet managed to 
impressively jump 41 positions in terms of “getting credit.”106  In consonance with 
general expectations for a country with its post-independence, centralized, de facto single 
party political record, Heritage characterizes the Gabonese economy as “mostly unfree” 
with an overall score of 56.4, a 113 of 179 World ranking and places it at 17th of 46 
economies within Sub-Saharan Africa. Heritage further highlights the intrusiveness of the 
state in the business and domestic markets. The state influences prices and subsidizes 
state-owned enterprises and maintains control of the development bank with no 
legitimate domestic, private capital source. Additionally, a lack of judicial transparency, 
sporadic enforcement of property rights laws, cumbersome administrative procedures, a 
poorly functioning labor market and pervasive corruption severely restrain the business 
environment and economic growth in general.107 Corruption is widespread. Transparency 
International rates Gabon a “highly corrupt” country with an overall score of 2.8 of 10.108 
The sustainability of economic opportunity is also major concern for Gabon. The Ibrahim 
Index, which is a composite of assessments considering public management, the business 
environment, infrastructure and the rural sector, consistently ranks Gabon in the bottom 
30% of Sub-Saharan Africa.109 (See Table 20.) Beyond the composite assessment pillars, 
this is most likely also due in part to the heavy reliance upon oil, the increasingly evident 
declining availability of proven reserves and the lack of economic diversity. 
As previously mentioned, the state is both corrupt and highly intrusive in 
domestic business markets. With respect to the tariff structure, Gabon institutes the 
highest tariffs as compared to our other case studies, across the majority of selected 
import examples. The income tax and corporate tax rates are 35%. Minerals, textiles, 
                                                 
106 International Finance Corporation. "Ease of Doing Business in Gabon," Accessed April 10, 2012, 
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manufactures, machinery and instrument tariffs stand at 10.4%, 26.8%, 29%, 12.3% and 
8% respectively. The average industrial tariff is 14% and the average agricultural tariff is 
17.1%.110 (See Table 19. And Figure 7.) Such elevated tariffs suggest that the Gabonese 
government is making it much more difficult to import overall, thus constraining the 
business environment. One can assume that this is both deliberate and potentially 
predatory in the face of a drop off in the availability of its core “rent” or the result of 
minimal economic regulatory competence. This effort is either directed at protecting 
domestic producers or maximizing government revenue to protect against future 
decreases in revenue when the oil reserves are depleted. Regardless, such high tariffs are 
unusual considering the growing need for diversification, technology transfer, foodstuffs 
and foreign direct investment. The data supports the assessments made by the IFC and 
the Heritage Foundation. Also, the analysis of this tariff structure supports the finding 
that the Gabonese state is in a weakened position relative to business and labor.      
The Gabonese labor market is unique for many reasons. It is exceptionally small 
and primarily urbanized yet not overly skilled. The population is estimated at only 1.5 
million and largely centered in Libreville, Port-Gentil and Franceville.111 The actual 
labor force is estimated to be approximately 713,796 and 35% of it is devoted to 
agriculture, which contributes only 5% of GDP.112 Unemployment is estimated at 
21%.113 The labor force, though miniscule, is permitted to organize into unions and has a 
decisive arm via the oil sector workers. Several trade unions exist and there have been 
historical accounts of effective pressuring of the government for either concessions or as 
a response to displeasure with a single party political structure. Port-Gentil is the critical 
oil hub, home to approximately 200,000 Gabonese and considered the economic capital 
                                                 
110 International Trade Center. "Market Access Map: Average Tariff Applied by Sector." International 
Trade Center, accessed December 1, 2011. 
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of Gabon. Strikes and protests in this area can be extremely effective. In 1990, in 
response to protests and riots, particularly in Port-Gentil, the state acquiesced to popular 
demands and grievances by agreeing to a national conference that led to political reform 
via multi-party elections later that year.114 Reliance upon oil and its work force is a key 
characteristic for the power of the oil-related labor organizations. The Organisation 
Nationale des Employés du Petrole (ONEP) is considered a powerful, emerging umbrella 
oil union that has achieved important reforms by the government as late as 2010. These 
reforms instituted limitations on the number of foreign workers authorized to hold jobs in 
the Gabonese oil market.115 This can be a double-edged sword in the aggregate because 
the state needs to import the technical skill and FDI to keep the oil industry going yet 
labor seeks to protect itself and the availability of jobs for the domestic workforce. The 
concern with the pressure power of this sector specific union is that the oil industry 
employs so few domestic workers and the skills required for employment are relatively 
high. In this instance, the real power exists with only a small section of the labor force 
and is susceptible to co-optation or being bought out as a whole, which leaves the 
remainder of the non-resource based labor organization with little ability to influence the 
political realm.  
Gabon is a premier example of the rentier state. Its income, economic diversity, 
labor, state and business characteristics highlight the susceptibility to volatile commodity 
markets, poor governance and the challenges of relying upon a finite and dwindling 
resource. A strange dynamic exists in the relationship between the state, labor and 
entrepreneurs in the case of Gabon. It cannot be described as balanced by any means yet 
opportunity for effective pressure on and political concessions from a highly involved 
state apparatus exist. The state has the controlling stake mainly due to the patrimonial ties 
of the executive down to the provinces and throughout the petroleum sector. The state 
                                                 
114 Filip Reyntjens. "The Winds of Change. Political and Constitutional Evolution in Francophone 
Africa, 1990-1991." Journal of African Law 35, no. 1/2, Recent Constitutional Developments in Africa 
(1991): pp. 44-55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/745493.  pp. 47-48; Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de 
Walle. "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa." Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (Jul., 1992): pp. 
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holds a firm grip on the critical economic element, oil. However, the widespread notion 
that oil may cease to be available as a central resource in the near term is a catalyst for 
change. Business leaders and labor stand to benefit a great deal from the vulnerability of 
the state. Tariff structures are such that domestic expansion into alternate industries is 
protected. The state is actually becoming increasingly reliant upon this expansion and is 
taking action to support domestic actors in terms of targeted industry development, 
special economic zones, energy capacity expansion, telecommunications investment, 
health programs and education initiatives.116 Unfortunately, the business environment is 
far from secure. It is very difficult for entrepreneurs to start up and navigate such a 
heavily regulated and inefficient structure. The labor force is highly unskilled and 
extremely limited in size at a mere 700,000 persons. Challenges in terms of scale and 
skill provide the major obstacle to Gabon. Though its petroleum sector provides a 
decisive arm of influence, the remainder of the Gabonese labor force will remain at a 
disadvantage until diversification takes hold or the oil runs out. The state is seemingly 
desperate to expand its sector composition yet limited to foreign investment as a result of 
insufficient domestic human and physical capital. The anticipated depletion of the 
petroleum sector causes a major concern for the Gabonese political establishment. It finds 
itself in the position whereas it must either develop meaningful alternatives for income 
replacement or attempt to explore untapped reserves. Gabon has ventured in both 
directions particularly in wood products and iron ore.117  
The current reliance upon a dwindling resource significantly detracts from the 
states bargaining power with private capitalists and labor forces, which, in turn, bolsters 
the potential for increases in democratic procedures. In this sense, the economic 
circumstances have the potential to directly affect a rise in legitimate democratic 
governance. Because the state is in a weakened position relative to business and labor due 
to the critical need for diversification beyond petroleum reliance, it is all the more 
susceptible to pressure for democratic political reform. The minimal capacity of labor is a 
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notable concern. It is small and relatively unskilled, which creates a problem for hiring 
into an expanding industrial sector. This could lead to further challenges with imported 
labor and a disproportional strengthening of the business-government relationship. While  
the results or effectiveness of the current conditions are far from certain, the opportunity 
exists to influence the balance of power in a manner that detracts from state dominance 
and provides for a more equitable relationship between the three groups.  
5. Analysis of Lipset’s Requisites  
Gabon’s political, social and economic characteristics in the context of industrial 
capacity, particularly the lack of industrial diversity meets Lipset’s social requisites only 
in part. The Gabonese class system is likely considered only partially open due to 
constraints provided by endemic corruption, institutionalized patrimonial networks and 
what is most assuredly obstacle-laden social mobility. In terms of the pervasiveness of an 
egalitarian value system, Gabon likely suffers due to high-income inequality and a 32% 
poverty rate.118 The dominance of the oil industry creates a social, political and economic 
divide amongst a small and largely urbanized population. Though spread across 40 ethnic 
groups, virtually all Gabonese are of Bantu origin, and the overwhelming majority speaks 
French, which adds to unity in a sense.119 The intrusiveness of the government in tariff 
structures, price manipulations, favoring of state-owned enterprises and corruption rates 
detracts from the overall capitalist nature of the Gabonese economy. It is extremely 
challenging to do business and the current reliance upon the petroleum sector in 
conjunction with historically poor governance and fiscal management is unsustainable. 
Competition is constrained. As for economic wealth, though, Gabon has one of the 
highest per capita income levels in Africa. Nationally speaking, this statistic is overtly 
positive yet as discussed above, income disparity is relatively severe. This combined with 
an exceedingly small population diverts from the reality that economic wealth rests in the 
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hands of a select few Gabonese elites. Gabon enjoys an 88% literacy rate, which is up 
from a 1993 rate of 72% and contributes significantly to popular ability to be of service 
or productive within the economy.120 The required domestic skills and technology for 
specific industrial work such as the petroleum or mining sectors is decidedly lacking, 
however and reliance falls upon the international community for uniquely skilled labor 
and technology transfer. Means and opportunity to mobilize and participate in the 
political process exist in Gabon yet are either sector specific in terms of effectiveness or 
are political parties authorized by political reform as recent as the 1990s. In sum, Gabon 
satisfies the requisites of economic wealth and literacy. It partially satisfies the requisites 
for pervasive egalitarianism, high participation in voluntary organization and a capitalist 











Table 7.   Satisfaction of Lipset’s Requisites & Bellin’s Balance- Gabon 
C. A BRIEF COMPARISON: SOUTH AFRICA AND GABON  
It is useful at this point to discuss how Gabon and South Africa compare and 
contrast in light of the fact that each is considered a high industrial performer yet via 
different means. My core hypothesis is that industrialization, as a process of economic 
diversification, is a necessary condition for modernization and development, which then 
shapes the conditions for the emergence and sustainment of democracy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. By extension, industrialization is not dependent upon democratization; however, 
successful democratization is dependent upon diversified industrialization. Gabon, the oil 
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dependent, “rentier” state, lacks the sector diversity that South Africa demonstrates. This 
correlates to the different ways in which they each satisfy or fail to satisfy certain social 
requisites provided by Lipset and how that contributes to democracy. The comparison of 
these two case studies in particular highlights the significance of the requisites of a 
capitalist economy and high participation in voluntary organizations. Gabon and South 
Africa both partially satisfy the requisites for an open class system and pervasive 
egalitarianism as well as satisfy the requisites for economic wealth and literacy. They 
markedly differ with respect to the capitalist nature of their economies and participation 
in voluntary organizations. 
The South African economy is considerably more capitalist than the Gabonese. 
The South African situation can be characterized as a business environment conducive to 
competition and profit maximization and sustainable economic opportunities that are 
spread across multiple sectors. Government regulation is not completely free market in 
practice but remains tolerable overall and is able to serve the needs of all three major 
groups simultaneously. The Gabonese situation is much less positive. Comparatively, its 
government is highly intrusive in terms of confusing tariff structures considering their 
contemporary needs, price manipulations, the favoring of state-owned enterprises and 
corruption rates. The Gabonese economy is unsustainable, over-regulated and heavily 
biased towards petroleum.  
South Africa has exceedingly high participation in voluntary organizations due to 
the strength and prevalence of organized labor as well as its capacity and power within 
the political establishment. COSATU and other umbrella trade unions effectively 
represent massive amounts of the labor force in the business and political spheres. By 
contrast, in Gabon, while employment in the petroleum sector is not prohibitively closed 
off, it requires highly skilled individuals in relatively small numbers. Unfortunately, this 
sector holds the primary attention of the state and offers the single opportunity for 
effective pressure by organized labor or business elites. The specific level of power and 
influence by business and labor in this sector does not transfer to the labor force as a 
whole.  
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The crucial difference lies in the manner in which these two requisites, satisfied in 
the case of South Africa yet merely partially satisfied in the case of Gabon, severely 
disrupts the critical balance amongst the major groups in Gabon. In Gabon, the lopsided 
reliance upon oil is highly constraining. In this case, the relationship between the state 
and the petroleum sector’s business leaders and labor force is disproportionate to that of 
the remainder of the economy. Support bases for each group are compartmentalized and 
the interdependency of the major groups is fractionalized. This ensures a situation where 
political elites, the entire labor force and entrepreneurs are unable to equitably hold each 
other accountable. Thus, a core tenet of democracy has not been achieved. South Africa, 
by contrast, achieves relative balance because the three are basically interdependent and 
accountability mechanisms exist for each. The success of each group is contingent upon 
input from all three. The South African state ensures a business environment conducive 
to competition and profit, as well as training and protections for its labor force. Private 
capitalists then expand into multiple sectors to make profits, which creates jobs for labor 
and provides diversification that is relied upon by the state for taxes and to mitigate 
commodity price volatility. Labor is able to effectively participate via the opportunistic 
job market and then organize in massive numbers across the many sectors that each have 
a stake in the conducive business environment and strong incentives for pressuring 
government to keep it that way. In this context, a diversified, industrial job market 
provides a key means for mass participation in the business, social and political arenas.  
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IV. MIDDLE PERFORMER—SENEGAL 
Senegal represents the lower end of the industrial middle-performing sub-group 
and provides an example of a western African country whose transition to democracy has 
been heavily strained for nearly 80% of its post-independence existence. Its autocratic 
tendencies remain despite governance flirtation with the democratic process. 
A. PATTERN OF DEMOCRACY 
The Republic of Senegal achieved its full independence from France in 1960 after 
a failed merger with Mali. Senegal would later attempt to coalesce with The Gambia in 
1982, yet that too would dissolve by 1989. In the meanwhile, President Leopold Senghor 
was elected in 1960 and led the Senegalese Democratic Bloc party. This political party 
was socialist in nature and founded alongside Mamadou Dia, a political ally of Senghor. 
Dia would serve as the first prime minister of post-independence Senegal yet was quickly 
removed following a perceived coup attempt in 1962. Senghor consolidated his power 
and served until his resignation in 1980 turning over power to his personally chosen 
successor Abdou Diof.121 Over the course of his extended tenure spanning four terms 
through 2000, Diof would gradually liberalize the country, which increased political 
participation yet continue to strain the political environment as a whole. Diof’s governing 
style consisted of suppressed coalition building, arrests of opposition leaders and alleged 
electoral fraud in subsequent elections. Abdoulaye Wade came to power via presidential 
elections in 2000, which were considered free and fair and represented a consolidation of 
democracy in the transition of power to an opposition party, the Senegalese Democratic 
Party (PDS). Since election, president Wade’s governance has been characterized as 
increasingly autocratic due to his amending of the constitution and seeking to increase 
executive power while suppressing all opposition.122 Polity IV data reinforces this 
description showing a gradual decrease in autocratic scores over the course of Senghor 
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and Diof’s presidencies. (See Figure 3. Also, See Table 16. And Figure 6.) The election 
of president Wade in 2000 marks a significant jump in democratic score, which has since 
decreased upon his re-election in 2007.123 As of April of 2012, Macky Sall has taken 
office after defeating Wade in an attempted bid for a third term made possible by his 
altering of the constitution. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Senegal Polity IV data (Polity 2 Subset; From 63) 
B. ECONOMIC SNAPSHOT AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY 
The Senegalese economy is based primarily upon foreign assistance, industrial 
fishing, tourism, services and mining. Of contributions to GDP, 17% comes from 
agriculture, 22% industry, 13% of which is manufacturing and 61% services. (See Table 
8. Also, See Table 15. And Figure 5.) Of particular note, 77.5% of the employed 
population is devoted to agriculture while 22.5% is involved in industry or services. 
Senegal, as of 2007, has an estimated unemployment rate of 48%.124 GDP per capita in  
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Senegal has remained basically on par with Sub-Saharan African trends. It surpassed the 
$1000 mark in 2007 and currently rests at $1,041, slightly below the Sub-Saharan 
African average of $1301.125  
 
Table 8.   Service Sectors by Contribution to GDP (From 52) 
C. MODERNITY ASSESSMENT 
Within the context of economic development and modernity, Senegal can be 
considered a slowly developing country and a marginal player within the global 
economy. Its economy is diversified across the major sectors and manufacturing makes 
up 13% of the industrial base. However, agriculture remains a major income source 
comprising 17% of GDP and over 77% of the formal labor force. It is also heavily 
dependent upon foreign assistance and struggles to update its infrastructure capacity to 
create more reliable conditions for industrial expansion into mining, chemicals and 
petroleum products.126 Senegal is therefore, highly susceptible to the volatility of the 
commodity markets and the willingness of donors to continue donating. While it is taking 
advantage of Highly Indebted Poor Countries debt relief and the benefits provided by the 
Millennium Development Challenge Account, Senegal remains a “factor driven 
economy” working towards setting the conditions for sustainable economic growth and 
gaining competitive advantage primarily through low-cost labor or natural resource 
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access.127 Sachs would most likely classify Senegal as a candidate to fall into 
“Malthusian decline” due to its total fertility rate of 4.7, a very high likelihood of 
contracting an infectious disease and health expenditures accounting for only 5.7% of 
GDP.128 Efforts to increase transport and agricultural investments as well as the 
expansion of imports to transfer technology are occurring yet the Senegalese economy 
and society have yet to be radically transformed as a whole. Cities such as Dakar are 
progressive yet overall, Senegal’s urban population rate is only 42% and increasing by 
approximately 3% annually.129 This likely places Senegal in the latter portion of the 
“preconditions stage,” according to Rostow. From a basic technology and connectivity 
perspective, Senegal has above average electricity, telephone and Internet capacity. 
Senegal’s teledensity ratio is better than 1 to 1, ranking 80th in the world. Internet usage 
is relatively confined to 1.8 million of Senegal’s 13 million people and ranks 76th 
worldwide. They also operate at an electrical surplus producing approximately 2.232 
billion kWh and consuming 1.763 billion kWh.130 (See Table 9. And Table 17.) 
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Table 9.   Modernization Assessment Senegal (From 130) 
D. THE CRITICAL RELATIONSHIP 
Industrial leaders and private capitalists within Senegal are subjected to a state 
that is considered highly corrupt.131 Though costs of crime and violence impose little 
harm, high levels of governmental regulation, challenges with access to bank loans, 
venture capital and minimal legal protections on borrower and lender rights place a heavy 
strain on the business environment.132 The International Finance Corporation ranks 
Senegal in the bottom 15% of the global business environment in terms of ease of doing 
business while the Heritage Foundation classifies the Senegalese economy as “mostly un-
free,” ranked 121 of 179 countries.133 The Senegalese government provides regulatory 
protections over domestic industry in the form of an average industrial tariff of 10.33%. 
Minerals, textiles, manufactures and miscellaneous manufactures imports are subject to 
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tariffs of 6.1%, 16.3%, 19.23% and 19.12% respectively.134 (See Table 19. And Figure 
7.) From these observations, it is clear that the state maintains the upper hand in its 
relationship with industrial entrepreneurs and fosters a challenging business environment 
overall.    
The total workforce in Senegal is estimated to be over 3.1 million as of 2006 and 
approximately 5.5 million in 2010. Merely 10% is estimated to be employed in the formal 
industrial sector in 2006 while estimates today have that figure at approximately 22%.135 
There are several formal sector national level trade unions, which are affiliated with the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). They are the Democratic Union of 
Senegalese Workers, National Trade Union Congress (UDTS), the National 
Confederation of Senegalese Workers (CNTS) and the National Union of Autonomous 
Trade Unions of Senegal (UNSAS). These formal sector unions have robust membership 
that provides meaningful but not overwhelming scale.  
The informal economy of Senegal is vast and significant for our purposes. It is not 
difficult to imagine the strength and influence of the informal sector’s ranks due to an 
unemployment rate estimated at 48% in 2007 and a poverty headcount at the national 
poverty line of 50.8%. There is income inequality as measured through the formal sector, 
but it is not severe. 45.9% of the income share goes to the highest 20% of the population, 
whereas 47.9% is directed towards the middle and 6.2% to the bottom 20%.136 (See 
Table 20.)  
Historically, the informal economy and UNACOIS, the French acronym for the 
Senegalese Union of Traders and Industrialists, has played monumental roles in the labor, 
business and political relationship within the country. Under president Senghor, the state 
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dominated the relationship between both labor and private capitalists by closely 
regulating any lucrative domestic industry and permitting only “guided” participation in 
policy implementation. Though formal sector association pressure resulted in new public 
financial institutions, the cost was co-optation and increased private capitalist 
dependency on the ruling elite. This resulted in the weak nature of domestic 
entrepreneurs that became heavily dependent upon a regime that sought to subjugate 
them in favor of increased foreign capital and patrimonial ties.137 In the 1980s, these 
relationships would change due to the passing of the presidency to Abdou Diof, reaction 
to structural adjustment programs and the rise of the informal sector and its own 
organizing faction, UNACOIS. A measurable divide had developed between the 
dependent industrial business leaders and the independent merchants and traders. The 
latter grew in wealth and scale, united by their exclusion from formal domestic power 
structures and their ability to circumvent the taxes, regulations and fees applied by the 
state. They were able to have a large impact on local manufacturing because of their 
long-standing contacts with wealthy businessmen that import merchandise directly from 
Asia, Europe and the U.S as well as their effective contestation of monopolies on the 
import and distribution of textiles.138 This provides the capacity and leverage to 
successfully press for state concessions, inclusion and protection because UNACOIS 
holds sway over a large, potentially taxable population and economic markets beyond the 
control of the state. UNACOIS, as a representative of informal labor, disrupted the 
clientelist relationship between private capital and the state. Over time this has become 
increasingly professional, credible and legitimate in the eyes of all actors.139 In the 
process, it has imposed a needed balance within the critical three-way relationship that, in 
effect, advances democratic practices. 
                                                 
137 Ibrahima Thioub, Momar-Coumba Diop, and Catherine Boone. "Economic Liberalization in 
Senegal: Shifting Politics of Indigenous Business Interests." African Studies Review 41, no. 2 (Sep., 1998): 
pp. 63-89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/524827. pg. 65. 
138 Ibrahima Thioub, Momar-Coumba Diop, and Catherine Boone. "Economic Liberalization in 
Senegal: Shifting Politics of Indigenous Business Interests." African Studies Review 41, no. 2 (Sep., 1998): 
pp. 63-89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/524827. pp. 75-76. 
139 Ibid., pg. 78. 
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The Senegalese state has a larger share in the power balance between itself, labor 
and private capitalists. This is due to its high regulatory framework, autocratic 
tendencies, corruption and generally setting poor conditions for a profitable business 
environment. This is not to say that the industrial sector is insignificant. As noted 
previously, 22% of GDP is industrially generated, 13% of which is from manufacturing 
and Senegal is looking to further expand its industrial infrastructure, productive industries 
and markets. Private capitalists do, however, face the challenges of a largely agricultural 
and/or informal labor force with lower education, skills and literacy rates. Though once 
significantly subservient to the political elite, the events of the 1980s altered the balance 
for private capitalists. Chief among those events is the paradoxical influence of 
UNACOIS, which is able to effectively influence both the state and business leaders 
despite the magnitude of its informal nature. Thus, in the Senegalese case, a slightly 
imbalanced relationship exists between the state, labor and entrepreneurs that has evolved 
and adjusted in response to the increasing influence of the informal, non-industrial labor 
force. Despite economic sector characteristics that mirror those of advanced countries in 
terms of contribution to GDP, the lopsided agricultural, informal, unskilled and 
uneducated nature of the labor force presents a key developmental obstacle. The state in 
this case, has the upper hand overall. Such an imbalance correlates to the autocratic 
characteristics of the regime under Abdoulaye Wade. The very recent transition of 
political power to Macky Sall bodes particularly well for Senegal as it represents a 
consolidation of democracy via the shifting of power to an opposition party and provides 
an opportunity to reestablish democratic momentum. 
E. ANALYSIS OF LIPSET’S REQUISITES  
The attributes inherent to the political economy analysis above provide input to 
the social requisites defined by Lipset. The openness of the class system is strained by the 
prevalence of corruption in both the government and business environment.140 The divide 
between the formal and informal economy is relatively severe, which is compounded by a 
high unemployment rate. While this may be offset by less than drastic income inequality, 
                                                 
140 World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011, 2011. Indicator 7.06, 3.5 of 7. 
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an egalitarian value system is not likely in this case. The economy, though generally 
capitalist in nature, struggles under the heavy hand of government regulation and price 
controls. As previously observed, it is difficult to start and do business in Senegal but not 
impossible. The Ibrahim Index, on average between 2000 and 2010, ranked Senegal 17th 
of 53 African nations in terms of sustainable economic opportunity. An average score of 
51.3 surpasses the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 42.6, which is relatively strong in 
comparison to peer regional economies.141 Challenges in access to loans or venture 
capital, a 2010 GDP of just over 12.9 billion and a per capita income of $1,041, which 
are both below regional averages demonstrate a lack of economic wealth even relative to 
the developing world. The massive prevalence of the informal economy and literacy rate 
of less than 50% do not satisfy the requirement for widespread literacy and capacity to 
effectively participate in the legal political or economic system.142 What is particularly 
unique and influential for the Senegalese case is the UNACOIS trade union. Legitimate 
representation of a large and illegitimate informal sector in the eyes of business and 
political elites is truly exceptional. This is a significant contribution to the high 
participation in voluntary organizations requirement. In sum, Senegal fails to satisfy the 
requisites for pervasive egalitarianism, economic wealth and literacy. It partially satisfies 
requisites for an open class system and capitalist economy. Ironically, despite informality 
and relatively negative employment data, Senegal satisfies the requisite for high 
participation in voluntary organizations. (See Table 10. And Table 14.) 
                                                 
141 Mo Ibrahim Foundation. The 2011 Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2011. Rank Ibrahim 
Index 2001- 2010. This variable is a composite of assessments considering public management, business 
environment, infrastructure and the rural sector. 














Table 10.   Satisfaction of Lipset’s Requisites & Bellin’s Balance- Senegal 
F. A CROSS-CASE EXPLANATION 
As stated above, the Senegalese state has the advantage in the critical three-way 
relationship, which disrupts the balance within the political economy. However, the 
informal, non-industrial labor force has become a key actor despite its overall 
agricultural, unskilled and uneducated characteristics. This factor reinforces the notion 
that labor in general is an important point of influence and that with increased 
opportunities for employment comes increased potential for mass participation in 
voluntary organizations, which then leads to increased participation in the political realm. 
Unemployment rates are considerably higher in Senegal and the formal labor force is 
overwhelmingly based in the agriculture sector. This is likely due to the prevalence of the 
informal sector, which is becoming more and more formalized via organizations like 
UNACOIS. It is critical to note that the independent merchants and traders that comprise 
UNACOIS have wealth, scale and the ability to compete with local manufacturing.143 In 
this sense, regardless of formality, the informal portion of the labor force are actually 
employed laborers and in the Senegalese case, have the means to participate in both the 
industrial sector and the political sphere. The already relatively strong industrial sector is 
actually stronger than the raw data implies and as a result, diversified by way of the 
                                                 
143 Ibrahima Thioub, Momar-Coumba Diop, and Catherine Boone. "Economic Liberalization in 
Senegal: Shifting Politics of Indigenous Business Interests." African Studies Review 41, no. 2 (Sep., 1998): 
pp. 63-89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/524827. pg. 65. 
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informal sector. That diversity generates influence on the state and business that is 
separate and apart from co-opted entities prior to the 1980s.  
This likely influences not just the high participation in voluntary organizations 
requisite but also the economic wealth requisite. With respect to the economic wealth 
implication, it is safe to assume that informally employed per capita incomes are not 
captured in the available statistics; and it is then possible to argue that the $1041 amount 
is artificially low because a potentially large portion of the 48% unemployment statistics 
actually earn income yet are “uncaptured” and therefore unmeasured by the state. This 
would mean that the ability to build and expend capital is more widespread than 
previously assessed. Earlier, I assessed the economic wealth requisite as unfulfilled. This 
further analysis would elevate that assessment to partially fulfilled, as it is difficult to 
assess whether the adjusted per capita income would surpass the Sub-Saharan African 
average of $1301. It is however, very possible considering the scale of the informal sector 
in Senegal. 
UNACOIS is clearly effective at advancing democratic ideals through its 
balancing effect on the relationship between the state, private capitalists and labor in 
Senegal. As it continues to increase and formalize, it is reasonable to expect gradual 
shifts in the power dynamic and potentially, increased revenue and political participation, 
which positively affects democratization. This highlights what is perhaps most important 
as a contributor to democracy in the Senegalese case, the access and influence of a unique 
labor force. That access and influence is not confined to one commodity or one sector, as 
in the case of Gabon, but spread over multiple formal and informal industries. Economic 
diversification provides multiple avenues to contact business elites as well as politicians 
by creating relatively accessible jobs and providing a means to build personal wealth, 
organize, mobilize and influence the other major groups. This then leads to an increased 
balance overall and helps explain why Senegal is able to outpace Gabon in terms of 
democratic measurement despite a smaller industrial contribution to GDP and agriculture 
heavy formal sector. 
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V. LOW PERFORMER—BURUNDI 
Burundi represents the low industrial performing sub-group and is an example of 
a country whose political landscape has transitioned from a monarchy to an oscillation 
between military regimes and pseudo-democratic autocracy and culminated in a recent 
attempt at democratic governance. The political and economic arenas have been largely 
marred by ethnic violence, open and devastating warfare, and power ascension via coup 
or assassination. 
A. PATTERN OF DEMOCRACY 
The Republic of Burundi is perhaps the most politically dynamic of the case 
studies. Since its independence in 1962 from Belgium, Burundi has endured continuous 
challenge to its governance via widespread violence, assassinations, depositions and 
coups within its political realm. In the interest of relative brevity, I will attempt to 
highlight the key elements of democratic evolution. Initially, a constitutional monarchy 
under Ganwa King Mwambutsa IV governed post-independence Burundi. This was 
abolished by the 1966 coup led by Capt Micombero who instituted a republic that in 
actuality was a de facto military regime. In 1976, a coup by Col Bazanga instituted 
another military regime that initially pressed forward political and social reforms, 
authorized a constitution in 1981 and a one-candidate election in 1984 before increasing 
autocratic tendencies of repression. A 1987 coup would replace Col Bazanga with Maj 
Buyoya, suspend the previous constitution and in 1991, a separate constitution was 
approved. This constitution instituted provisions for a president, multi-ethnic government 
and parliament while leading to the election of the first Hutu president, Melchior 
Ndadaye (FRODEBU party) in 1993. Ndadaye, the first democratically elected president 
of Burundi, was assassinated a mere three months later and Burundi descended into a 
civil war that would kill what is estimated to be hundreds of thousands of Burundians. 
Hutu and Tutsi leaders remained at a political impasse yet with the significant assistance 
of many other African countries, Burundi elected Pierre Nkurunziza as president in 2005 
and adopted a post-transitional constitution. The civil war ended in 2006 with the final 
reconciliation of the Paliphehutu in 2009. President Nkurunziza ran unopposed and was 
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re-elected in 2010.144 Polity IV scores reflect the political instability and entrenched 
autocracy of monarchal and military regimes. Democratic scores spike in 2005 alongside 
the implementation of the massively popular post-transitional constitution and continue to 
gain durability to the present day.145 (See Figure 4. Also, See Table 16. And Figure 6.) 
 
Figure 4.   Burundi Polity IV data (Polity 2 Subset; From 63)  
B. ECONOMIC SNAPSHOT AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY 
The Burundian economy is largely dependent upon coffee and tea exports as well 
as foreign assistance. Continuous security and refugee challenges have prevented 
meaningful development of supporting infrastructure and industrial capacity beyond the 
processing of agricultural products.146 Manufacturing is minimal and potential natural 
resources remain largely neglected due to lack of investment in such an unstable political, 
social and economic environment. As contributors to GDP, 35% results from agriculture, 
20% industry, 9% of which is manufacturing, and 45% services. (See Table 11. Also, See 
Table 15. And Figure 5.) GDP per capita in Burundi is a dismal $192 having never 
surpassed a high-water mark of $240 in 1986. It remains well below the average SSA of 
                                                 
144 The U.S. Department of State. "Diplomacy in Action: Background Note: Burundi," Accessed 
March 30, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2821.htm.  
145 Marshall, Monty G., Jaggers, Keith. Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions 
Datasets. Polity IV: Annual Time-Series 1800-2010. 2010.  Polity 2 data averages -7 for consolidated 
autocracy transforming to above average democratic measures from 2005 and beyond. 
146 The U.S. Department of State. "Diplomacy in Action: Background Note: Burundi," Accessed 
March 30, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2821.htm. 
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$1301.147 Little industrial capacity exists. However, light consumer goods, imported 
components assembly and food processing are growing domestic industries. Estimates 








Agriculture  2%  24%  35% 
Industry  29%  29%  20% 
Manufacturing  16%  9%  9% 
Services  69%  47%  45% 
Table 11.   Service Sectors by Contribution to GDP (From 52) 
C. MODERNITY ASSESSMENT 
Burundi fits Michael Porter’s “factor driven economy” nearly to the letter. Indeed, 
low-cost, low-skilled labor is the dominant source of competitive advantage for 
agricultural production of coffee and tea for export. Dependence upon these products, 
lack of widespread modern production technologies and negligible economic 
diversification into secondary and tertiary sectors ensure continued sensitivity to “world 
economic cycles, commodity price trends and exchange rate fluctuations.”149 Technology 
is also primarily absorbed through imports, which is supported by Burundi’s tariff 
structure. Though Jeffrey Sachs does not specifically assign Burundi to one of his five 
categories of growth, it can be anticipated that Burundi exists either as a “primary 
producer” or in “Malthusian decline.”150 This is based upon commodity exports of 
greater than or equal to 10% of GNP and a total fertility rate of greater than or equal to 
                                                 
147 The World Bank. "Data: Burundi," Accessed March 30, 2012, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/burundi.  
148 "Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook," Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html.  
149 Michael E. Porter. Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: The Current 
Competitiveness Index- Business School Stage Theory Harvard Business School, 2002. pg. 8. 
150 Jeffrey D. Sachs. "Globalization and Patterns of Economic Development." Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv 136, no. 4 (2000): 579-599. pg. 582 and 583. Malthusian deline refers specifically to growing 
populations outstripping a country’s capacity to support and sustain that population with respect to land 
availability, health and basic services. 
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4.0.151 Clearly, Burundi neither exists on the cutting edge of technology nor does it quite 
satisfy Rostow’s needed changes in non-industrial sectors to earn “Preconditions Stage” 
recognition. Its placement is closer to the “traditional society” stage but progressing. 
Burundi exhibits characteristics of a country where the majority of its social and 
political economy maintain “traditional societal” ways yet the government and political 
elites are taking action to set the conditions for emergence up the scale. The urban 
population stands at 11% of the gross with an estimated 5% annual increase compounded 
by a 3.4% annual overall population growth rate.152 The lack of more up to date 
technologies in the agricultural sector stifle the ability to both feed the growing urban 
masses and export for profit beyond coffee and tea products.153 Government budget share 
increases in agriculture, health and education, technology transfer-friendly tariff 
structures combined with active involvement by Vice President Gervais Rufykiri to 
strengthen the business environment for foreign investment and domestic entry highlight 
a state intent on industrializing to take the country beyond its traditional limitations. 
Recent efforts to expand the energy and mining industry, heavy investment in 
information and communications technologies (ICT) as well as positive trends in 
alternative capital availability also show Burundi as a country on the cusp of 
“Preconditions” status according to Rostow.154  
From a basic technology and connectivity perspective, Burundi has extremely 
limited electricity, telephone and Internet capacity. In fact, the CIA World Factbook 
notes that only 1 in 100 people utilize fixed telephone services and 10 in 100 use mobile 
phones. Burundi produces a mere 208 million kWh in electricity and consumes 273.4 
million kWh. It is forced to import the deficit from neighboring DRC every year. 
                                                 
151 The World Bank. "Data: Burundi," Accessed March 30, 2012, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/burundi. Measured Total Fertility Rate of 4.5 in 2009. 
152 "Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook," Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html.  
153 African Economic Outlook. Burundi 2011: AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011. pg. 6. 
154 African Economic Outlook. Burundi 2011: AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011. pg. 12. Wayne 
E. Nafzinger. Economic Development. 4th ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. pg. 128. 
comparable elements to the “radical non-industrial changes,” Nafzinger cites Rostow’s 1961 The Stages of 
Economic Growth. 
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Additionally, only 158,000 Burundians access the Internet, which ranks them 147th 
worldwide in this regard.155 (See Table 12. And Table 17.) We can effectively isolate 
Burundi to the bottom or near bottom of development and modernization scales. Burundi 
suffers from multiple critical obstacles to successful growth, namely a repressed 
infrastructure, deficient business environment, an uneducated, overwhelming agriculture-
based labor force, wildly unbalanced, ethnically tense rural and urban population 
distribution and a highly unstable political realm. However, despite such seemingly 
insurmountable challenges, it cannot necessarily be considered static along these scales. 















Table 12.   Modernization Assessment Burundi (From 152) 
D. THE CRITICAL RELATIONSHIP 
The Burundian business environment is exceedingly strained and at present, not 
conducive to large-scale industrial growth or playing a significant role in the political 
realm. It is arguably one of the worst business environments in the world, which is not 
surprising considering the consistent instability in the country post-independence. Crime 
and violence, legal rights challenges, and difficulty in accessing loans or venture capital 
increase transaction costs for aspiring entrepreneurs, which creates significant barriers to 
                                                 
155 Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook," Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. 
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entry.156 The Heritage foundation describes Burundi as a “repressed” economy suffering 
from an intrusive and inefficient state apparatus, obstacle laden private sector policy, 
poor property rights and widespread corruption.157 The World Economic Forum agrees 
and further annotates that the four most problematic factors of doing business in Burundi 
are accessing financing, corruption, policy instability and tax regulations.158 Despite 
these grim data points, such negative characteristics do not comprise the entire story. 
Interestingly, the International Finance Corporation World Bank Group Doing Business 
data shows several small improvements in the Burundian situation. In particular, 
protecting investors jumped 107 positions from 153rd in 2011 to 46th in 2012.159 Also, 
according to the 2011 Africa Competitiveness Report, the burden of government 
regulations is minimal to the extent that Burundi ranks 75th of 139 countries.160 
Unfortunately, this is more likely due to a lack of government capacity rather than 
deliberate freedom provided by state policy. Though Burundian banking or financial 
institutions consistently lack sufficient resources, alternative sources of capital and 
international funding are on the rise.161 However, this more likely highlights Burundi’s 
heavy reliance upon foreign aid and much less likely showcases its domestic economic 
prowess.   
The Burundian state, as evidenced previously, is a highly corrupt and unstable 
platform for governance. It has an excessively challenged history that lacks any true 
contemporary positive continuity. Corruption is rampant, favoritism by government 
                                                 
156 World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011. Indicators 1.14 (3.1- 129 of 139), 8.06 (2.7- 135 of 139), 8.04 (1.6- 135 of 
139), 8.05 (1.5- 139 of 139).   
157 The Heritage Foundation. "2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Burundi," Accessed March 30, 
2012, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/burundi.  
158 World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011.  
159 International Finance Corporation. "Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations," Accessed 
March 30, 2012, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/burundi. 
160 World Economic Forum, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011. 
161 The Miliken Institute. Capital Access Index 2006, edited by James R. Barth, Tong Li, Triphon 
Phumiwasana and Glenn Yago. Vol. 2006. Capital Access Index 2009, edited by James R. Barth, Tong Li, 
Wenling Lu and Glenn Yago 2010. Alternative Sources of Capital rankings 105 in 2006; 91 in 2009; 
International Funding 97 in 2006; 82 in 2009 
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officials is widespread and cronyism is commonplace.162 Despite disarm, demobilize and 
reintegration programs and the inclusion of rebel groups into the political process, 
violence and election tampering continue to plague the political arena. However, the 
importance of setting the conditions for short-term stability and long-term economic 
growth are not lost on the political leadership. Fiscal and monetary policy are taking aim 
at capturing more of the informal economy, taking advantage of HIPC debt cancellations 
by making it increasingly difficult to accrue short-term public debt, controlling the 
money supply and stabilizing the exchange rate.163  
Burundi’s 2nd Vice President, Gervais Rufyikiri, is focused on economic growth, 
diversification and the reorientation of the business environment. Since coming to office, 
he has utilized the 9 “Doing Business” elements as planning factors for policy 
adjustments and pressed the launching or reorganization of several public and private 
economic institutions. The establishment of the Burundian Investment Promotion 
Authority has streamlined the inefficient investment analysis bureaucracy and led to 
unprecedented activity in food processing, energy, mining and information 
communications technologies. Also, the Burundi Business Incubator (BBIN), launched in 
Nov 2010, is a two-phased non-profit organization that develops entrepreneurship and 
general business skills in both established and new Burundian small and medium 
domestic enterprises. While the BBIN does not provide loans, it does facilitate access to 
financing as well as assists in the refinement of business plans and strategic management 
whose goal is to generate domestic business, firm and industrial growth.164  
The tariff and tax rates implemented by the Burundian state help to demonstrate 
the balancing act it exercises while attempting to shape long-term economic and political 
needs. The income and tax rates are relatively average for the continent. An average 
                                                 
162 Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2010," Accessed November 29, 2011, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results. 1.8 score; one position from 
the worst; Ranked 170 of 178.; Favoritism Africa Competitiveness Report 2011 Indicator 1.07- 2.5- 113 of 
139.  
163 African Economic Outlook. Burundi 2011: AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011. pg. 8 and 9.  




industrial tariff of 6.6%, average agricultural tariff of 21.9%, manufactures, machinery 
and instrument tariffs of 22.7%, 4.5% and 1.6% respectively highlights a regulatory 
framework that is interested in attracting certain industrial goods and technology while 
disincentivising agricultural imports.165 (See Table 19. And Figure 7.) This helps to 
protect domestic agricultural markets and the related labor force from external 
competition as well as indirectly suppresses domestic industrial growth. Though it can be 
assumed that the state must allow if not promote the infusion of international industrial 
products due to both the need for technological imitation and the lack of domestic 
alternatives, the result is the same. The tariff structure creates another barrier to entry for 
private capitalists with non-agricultural industrial ambition and the state represses the 
industrial business environment. The private capitalist position in this instance is unusual 
but seemingly advantageous. While the monetary barrier to entry exists, it can be 
overcome with sufficient capital accumulation. The state is likely quite eager to facilitate 
domestic industrial growth and therefor malleable to pressure, willing to increase legal 
protections via property rights and boost social capital by way of health and education 
investments. Both of these actions have occurred since 2005.166  
Burundian skilled labor is one of the main challenges to domestic industry. The 
heavy imbalance of labor to the primary sector and several other social factors raises 
adjacent concerns with mass participation in labor or political organizations and 
processes. 94% of the Burundian labor force is in the agriculture sector, with only 2% 
involved in industry and 4% in services. There is a 68% poverty rate, 60% literacy rate, 
only 1 in 2 go to school and 1 in 15 has HIV/AIDS.167 Statistics are difficult to determine 
due to an 89% rural population and again, the agricultural core competency. However, it 
is estimated that 89% of the 15 year old and older population actively participates in the 
                                                 
165 International Trade Center. "Market Access Map: Average Tariff Applied by Sector," Accessed 
December 1, 2011. 
http://www.macmap.org/Index.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fCountry.Analysis.Results.AverageMFN.aspx.  
166 African Economic Outlook. Burundi 2011: AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011. pg. 16. 
167 "Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook," Accessed November 29, 2011, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. African Economic Outlook. 
Burundi 2011: AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA, 2011. pg. 16. 
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labor market while the shadow economy is estimated to account for 39.5% of GDP. 168 
This is a significant amount of “uncaptured” revenue for state regulatory agencies.  
42.8% of earned income reaches the highest 20% of the population while only 9% 
reaches the lowest 20%.169 (See Table 20.) Organized labor is limited primarily to the 
Confederation of Burundian Unions (COSYBU) and the Independent Labor Party, which 
is a small, primarly ethnic Tutsi political entity. Neither are significant players within the 
economic or political arenas. President Nkurunziza has implemented two key social 
reforms that impact the labor force. In addition to free primary education, President 
Nkurunziza declared free health services to pregnant women and children under 5 and 
correspondingly dramatically increased the fiscal budgets for these sectors. This is 
problematic, however, considering the severe reliance upon foreign aid to back the 
Burundian budget and these programs specifically.  
The Burundian example demonstrates a political economy that consists of a weak 
and corrupt government, repressed business environment and a lopsided, massively 
unskilled and unorganized labor force. Entrepreneurs are dependent upon the political 
climate and by extension the state itself in order to garner growth momentum. This 
reliance is diminished by the introduction of international aid and regulatory institutions 
that can maneuver around state weakness and the palpable need of industry by the state 
for economic diversification and urbanization. They are also dependent upon the labor 
force, which is unskilled from an industrial perspective. Private capitalists, conceding 
challenges posed by widespread corruption, are able to exert influence and pressure on 
government but must acquiesce to the limitations imposed by an underdeveloped work 
force. The state requires assistance both from the international arena in terms of foreign 
aid as well as domestically from business elites in order to generate the economic growth 
that could lend itself to political legitimacy. It is not, however, reliant upon the majority 
of the population for political traction beyond having to create the opportunity to develop 
                                                 
168 Andreas Buehn and Freidrich Schneider. "Shadow Economies Around the World: Novel Insights, 
Accepted Knowledge and New Estimates." International Tax and Public Finance no. July 2011 (2011).  
The World Bank. "Data: Burundi," Accessed March 30, 2012. http://data.worldbank.org/country/burundi.  
169 The World Bank. "Data: Burundi," Accessed March 30, 2012. 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/burundi.  
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a healthy, educated and trained workforce. This makes the state malleable from a political 
pressure perspective, particularly by private capitalists as they seek to maximize profit 
and protect their gains via state policy and law. The labor force has no real ability to  
pressure the government or business leaders politically but stands to gain dramatically in 
terms of learning the skills required to transition beyond subsistence agriculture and rural 
isolation. 
E. ANALYSIS OF LIPSET’S REQUISITES  
The Burundian case is a telling description of a highly imbalanced state, private 
capitalist and labor relationship that helps our understanding of the relationship between 
industrialization and democratization on the continent. Its record of political, social and 
economic turmoil is not without peers in the region and can provide a highly 
generalizable context to apply in similar regional examples. Burundi also has distinct 
contributions and gaps among Lipset’s requisites. Individual effort and achievements do 
not necessarily define social hierarchies in Burundi. Corruption, cronyism and strained 
social factors hamper the openness of the class system. The egalitarian nature of its 
population is also highly contentious considering the significant history of ethnic 
violence between the Hutu and Tutsi. While it can be expected that these tensions will 
ease over time, and potentially be accelerated via sustained and well-distributed 
economic growth, the severity of the conflict will make that very difficult. Additionally, 
the extreme lack of industrial capacity, related unskilled workforce and heavy agricultural 
labor base establish a demonstrable line that hampers popular egalitarian view. However, 
the converse may be true because so much of the country lives and works in rural areas 
and is devoted to agriculture. The capitalist nature of the economy is murky at best. 
Current government regulations, political uncertainty and a repressive business 
environment are not conducive to competition and profit maximization. Burundi’s ability 
to build and expend capital in order to garner economic wealth remains strained due to 
minimal non-agricultural industrial capacity and a tremendous reliance upon foreign aid. 
Educational opportunities of such quality that people may communicate and acquire the 
skills necessary to be of service or productive within the economy are low but rising. A 
literacy rate of 60%, a mere 6% employment in non-agricultural sectors and the 
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ineffective nature of labor organizations in Burundi are formidable obstacles to an 
legitimate means of mobilizing, interacting and participating in voluntary organizations 
to a degree that would provide real pressure to business and political leadership. In sum, 
Burundi only partially  
satisfies the literacy requisite and fails to fulfill requisites for an open class system, 
pervasive egalitarianism, economic wealth, a capitalist economy and high participation in 












Table 13.   Satisfaction of Lipset’s Requisites & Bellin’s Balance- Burundi 
The many years of conflict, refugee migrations, heavy civilian casualties and 
political insecurity has seemingly exhausted the Burundian people. This likely translates 
to both domestic and international fatigue with the constant strife, particularly in the 
leadership of the African central and southern regions. In the case of this type of social, 
political and economic drain, the state is likely largely dependent upon the private 
capitalists and labor for any potential economic growth and is much more likely to 
acquiesce to popular demand for democratic governance as it struggles to stabilize its 
domestic situation. Internationally, there will likely continue to be extreme pressure and 
aid incentives to institute and consolidate democratic ideals. Considering the potential for 
natural resource extraction and the revenue that will provide for economic diversification, 
entrepreneurs and labor have the upper hand from a bargaining perspective as Burundi 
industrializes. Ethnic reconciliation, institutional strengthening and economic policy 
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along the lines of Nigeria’s oil-based price rule may well be critical to short term stability 
and long term growth as mineral extraction evolves.170 Most important, though, is the 
political situation. Repressing corruption, ensuring a secure elective political process and 
maintaining the delicate peace will be critical to instilling the confidence of both the local 
and international communities in order to sustain the positive social, economic and 
political momentum seen in recent years. 
F. A CROSS-CASE EXPLANATION 
Following the Senegalese case, I addressed the observation that Senegalese polity 
IV scores were stronger than those allocated to Gabon, despite Gabon’s stronger 
industrial contribution to GDP. Burundi, too, can be considered more democratic than 
Gabon, though less in comparison to Senegal. An explanation of this is slightly more 
problematic considering the fact that, in Burundi, trade unions of any formality are of 
little political consequence, per capita incomes are very low and the composition of the 
labor force precludes effective participation in the political realm. It is important to 
remember that Burundian social, political and economic capacity is exceedingly strained 
by the many years of conflict, refugee migrations, heavy civilian casualties and political 
insecurity discussed above. It is also key to keep in mind that the polity score itself 
focuses upon the institutional strength of the central government, which assuredly 
correlates these scores more closely to dramatic democratic institutional developments 
while Burundi emerged from civil war in the early 2000s than to that of business or labor 
pressure.  
It is worth noting that manufacturing as a percentage contribution to GDP is 
higher in Burundi than in Gabon and that what little industry does exist is dominated by 
the processing of agricultural raw materials. This demonstrates a consolidated supply 
chain, especially for coffee and tea, which domestically connects a relatively large 
portion of the 94% agriculture-based labor force to the industrial value chain. In this 
context, a large portion of the domestic population is connected to, however indirectly, 
the Burundian industrial complex via home grown agricultural processing. Private 
                                                 
170 Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi. "Nigeria's Shot at Redemption: Turning Nigeria's Windfall into a 
Blessing." Finance & Development (2008).  
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capitalists are able to minimize transaction costs of procuring raw materials, which assists 
in maximizing profitability in what is already a strained business environment. The state, 
desperate to capitalize on its comparative advantage in unskilled labor, incentivizes the 
agro-processing industry via the tariff structure and seeks to add as much revenue as 
possible to the yearly foreign aid donations. Deftly, the Burundian state diverts foreign 
aid payments to investments in domestic health and education and acquiesces to external 
insistence on democratic reform in order to keep revenue streams active. In this case, 
Burundi’s democratization is due more to external than internal pressure.  
Unfortunately, Burundi’s conflict riddled history has seemingly reset its 
developmental trajectory and external influence distorts the domestic power balance 
between the state, entrepreneurs and labor. Capacity is miniscule, foreign aid dependence 
artificially affects domestic balance and so few of Lipset’s requisites are achieved by way 
of industrial contributions that legitimate liberal democracy could be indefinitely delayed. 
This highlights the insufficiency of economic diversification alone to explain 
democratization. It also serves as a cautionary note on externally driven democratization, 
which is broadly applicable to the region. 
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VI. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This analysis has sought to better understand the relationship between 
industrialization and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa by examining the relative 
balance between the state, industrial entrepreneurs and labor in four countries in the 
region. Delving into the details of this balance provides a clear picture of what 
contributes to the relative power or strength each achieves within this critical three-way 
relationship. This provides the mechanism to further understand how industrial 
characteristics of an economy contribute to a nation’s social make-up. Then, by utilizing 
those same industrial characteristics in the social context, it is possible to gain reliable 
insight into key pre-conditions for democracy, which delineate a certain pattern of 
democratization. This particular method aligns closely to Eva Bellin’s “contingent 
democrat” theory, and continues that research with a narrowing of case studies to the 
African continent. Additionally, reviewing the fulfillment of or gaps in the satisfaction of 
certain social requisites for democracy within a set of specific Sub-Saharan African 
countries applies the concept introduced by Seymour Martin Lipset. In effect, the 
aggregate effort brings these two theories together and applies them through a region-
specific lens. It also provides a forum to revisit the concept of modernization on the 
African continent and generally assess particular levels of modernity achieved in the 
context of industrial capacity and economic stages of growth.    
Selecting South Africa, Gabon, Senegal and Burundi as cases for examination 
provides an overall, though admittedly limited, cross sectional view of dissimilar political 
economies and divergent experiences with democratic and economic development. This 
is in large part due to the dissimilarity of their industrial capacities and related social and 
economic characteristics. The intent behind the selection of these particular case studies 
was to provide an analysis of countries from different sections of the continent with 
different industrial capacities to more generally understand the relationship between 
industrialization and democratization within Sub-Saharan Africa. These examples span 
the high, medium and low classifications of industrial performance both in terms of 
manufacturing ability as well as mineral or petroleum extraction. Despite the limited 
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number of case studies, it is possible to draw several general conclusions from this 
research effort as well as specifically address the main research question, hypothesis, 
regional prospects for democracy and potential policy implications for the United States.  
A. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Bellin “contingent democrat” theory is applicable to our case studies in terms 
of a relative balance or imbalance of the relationship between labor, industrial 
entrepreneurs and the state. If any element has characteristics that alter its influence or 
the influence of one of the other elements in the direction of disequilibrium, the 
propensity for democratic procedure lessens. Alternately, if the relationship is in relative 
equilibrium, democratic tendencies are increasingly evident. More specifically, in cases 
of disequilibrium, if the state in particular is susceptible to effective pressure or influence 
by entrepreneurs or labor, that system is then much more likely to adjust towards 
democratic ideals. The combination of these attributes effectively illustrates a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between industry and democracy within South Africa, 
Gabon, Senegal and Burundi, which provides a glimpse into the larger realm of Sub-
Saharan Africa. It demonstrates the nature of the contemporary relationship between the 
state, labor and private capitalists as one of independence yet reliant cooperation in the 
case of South Africa. In Gabon, it is evident that the state is becoming increasingly reliant 
upon entrepreneurs and labor to effectively rectify an undiversified economy in order to 
maintain the status quo high per capita income as its key resource expires. In the case of 
Senegal, there is evidence of dependence on the state by private capitalists and an 
increasing ability to regulate power by a disproportionately large yet increasingly 
formalized, informal labor force. Burundi exemplifies a case where the state is weak, 
corrupt and more malleable due to its reliance upon foreign aid and distinct need for 
industrial capacity. In this instance, much like Gabon, there is increasing potential for 
industrial entrepreneurs and labor to project into the political sphere.  
From this research, several general observations can be made. The initial three 
serve to support the research methodology, the use of Bellin’s ‘contingent democrat’ 
theory and Lipset’s prerequisites. First, the ways in which the aspects of a country’s 
political economy contribute to Lipset’s social requisites for democracy are effectively 
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measured by taking a detailed look at critical relationships between the major players in a 
political economy, the state, entrepreneurs and labor. Second, the degrees to which 
Lipset’s requisites are met provide an accurate, though general, assessment of the current 
state of democracy within a nation. (See Table 14.) Third, the balance between these 
three key players over time can be considered a key contributor to the pattern of 
democratization within a given country. This is because the balance equates to an 
overarching form of restraint upon each element, which is a decidedly democratic ideal. 
If an effective balance exists, as in the case of South Africa, and steps are periodically 
taken to test or strengthen relationships, the prognosis for democracy is excellent. 
However, if each element does not maintain the capacity and power to effectively 
influence the others, democratic strength will diminish. In the instance of ineffective 
balance, such as the case of Senegal or Gabon, autocratic tendencies are evident. As 
witnessed by the rise Senegal’s UNACIOS, the assertion of empowered, mobilized labor 
disrupted autocratic habits and rebalanced the equation in the direction of a more 
mutually beneficial and an increasingly democratic arrangement. In the Gabonese 
example, the extreme influence of the petroleum sector fractionalizes the combined 
power of labor as a whole and promotes an economy of rents whose lucrative excess is 
prone to mismanagement and diversification is then stifled. The state is not reliant upon 
the population while the oil rents continue to accrue. These observations are somewhat 
comforting in that they validate the original research theories put forth by Bellin and 
Lipset as well as provide some additive legitimacy to a few more specific conclusions 







Africa  Gabon  Senegal  Burundi
Open Class System  Partial  Partial  Partial  No 
Egalitarian Value System  Partial  Partial  No  No 
Economic Wealth  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Capitalist Economy  Yes  Partial  Partial  No 
Literacy  Yes  Yes  No  Partial 
High Participation in Voluntary 
Organizations  Yes  Partial  Yes  No 
Balance (Bellin)  Yes  Partial  Partial  No 
Table 14.   Satisfaction of Lipset’s Requisites & Bellin’s Balance 
In addition to the aforementioned validations, this specific research has enabled 
several general conclusions that can be drawn from our case studies. First, single 
industry, aid reliance, or a lack of economic diversity whether via industrial agriculture, 
petroleum, minerals or external donors holds a country hostage and vulnerable to 
stagnation. The volatility of the particular commodity market or the uncertainty of 
continued donor support negatively impacts multiple social requisites for democracy as 
described by Lipset and ultimately detracts from democratic potential or ideals. This is 
evident in the cases of Gabon and Burundi. Each of these countries reaps the negative 
impact of a lack of industrial diversity in the form of widespread uncertainty, which is 
destabilizing overall. This contributes to the broader conversation concerning foreign aid 
as well and therefor has policy implications for donors.  
Second, a lack of diversified industrial capability severely restricts opportunities 
for formal employment, which has a negative impact on the prospects for 
democratization. This is evident most prominently in the cases of Senegal and Burundi 
yet also applies to Gabon. In Senegal, the informal economy is large to the point that its 
masses obstruct the relationship between the state and an industrial labor force. However, 
in this case, UNACIOS has shown the ability to affect the state apparatus on behalf of 
large segments of the informal labor market. Perhaps not ironically, in doing so, it has 
increasingly formalized itself and its members and contributed to an egalitarianism value 
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system, the ability to build and expend economic wealth and participation in voluntary 
organizations. In Burundi, the excessive number of Burundians employed in the 
agricultural sector deprives the nation of a skilled industrial labor force, which precludes 
industrial capacity and detracts from each democratic social requisite. Gabon’s lack of 
industrial diversity renders it beholden almost solely to the variance of the oil market, the 
demands of the oil labor force and its mostly international business leadership.    
Third, industrialization is critical to the effective democratization of Sub-Saharan 
African countries because it provides capacity that is central to each major group 
individually, the nation as a whole and the requisites for democratization. Entrepreneurs 
and private capitalists gain market access and opportunities to invest and make profits at 
a greater scale. They can establish firms with the reasonable expectation of returns thus 
creating wealth that transfers to the state via taxes on products sold and the labor force 
via wages for jobs worked. This contributes to the ability to build and expend economic 
wealth and the capitalist nature of the economy. Labor gains multiple formal employment 
opportunities, a means to monetarily support themselves, a connection to organized 
representation and access to the provision of public services. This contributes directly to 
an open class system, pervasive egalitarianism, and high participation in voluntary 
organizations. The state gains revenue for national budgets, the ability to provide public 
services like health and education, achieves political legitimacy in the eyes of its 
population, creates exports for international connectivity and diversifies its economy so 
as to mitigate single source commodity volatility and enhance the sustainability of the 
nation over the long-term. This contributes directly to the capitalist nature of the 
economy, opportunities to increase literacy and the ability to build and expend economic 
wealth. In this instance, there is balance and interdependence between the major groups 
and each of Lipset’s social requisites has been addressed. Such positive gains generate a 
desire for protection and consolidation via codified restraints, checks and balances. 
Reinforced, protected capacity assists in the establishment of a strong foundation upon 
which sustainable progress for each can be made.  
The fourth and final conclusion concerns the prospects for democracy. The 
prospects for democracy in Sub-Saharan African countries are more likely, though clearly 
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not guaranteed, for countries that have balance or are trending towards balance in the 
critical three-way relationship. The more imbalance that exists, especially via an 
overwhelming state, the weaker the prospects become and it can be expected that it will 
take longer to achieve democracy. Burundi is the strongest example. Those prospects 
increase as social requisites are increasingly satisfied, which can be seen in the cases of 
Senegal, Gabon and South Africa.  
B. REGIONAL PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 
Sub-Saharan Africa is a mix of many countries each with different levels of 
balance within their political economies. This balance can increase and decrease at any 
time in terms of autocracy or democracy. There is no guarantee that South Africa will 
remain a strong democracy indefinitely. Likewise, Senegal will not necessarily continue 
democratic progress, which could be seen in President Wade’s increasingly autocratic 
style of governance. The election of Macky Sall and the consolidation of democracy in 
the Sengalese case is certainly a step in the democratic direction. In the case of Gabon 
and Burundi, it is possible that each of these countries experienced the key “stressor” or 
political crisis that has the ability to act as the historical catalyst for economic, social and 
political change. Political or economic crisis has been known to play a critical role 
around the world in bringing new leadership to power and reinforcing legitimacy of 
progressive, new policies.171 It is then quite possible that such new leadership and 
policies may lead to a more balanced relationship and then concurrent with the fourth 
conclusion of this research and despite the democracy’s fragile nature, those countries 
that have stronger three-way balance have stronger prospects for the emergence and 
sustainment of democracy.  
The additional observation of the per capita incomes for these countries aligns to 
their economic and democratic characteristics and directly correlates to Lipset’s 
“economic wealth” social requisite. It also provides another angle in the examination of 
                                                 
171 Minxin Pei. "Constructing the Political Foundations of an Economic Miracle " In Behind East 
Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity, edited by Henry S. Rowen. New York: 
Routledge, 1998. Pp. 44, 45. The author specifically addresses examples from South Korea, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma and China. Malysia is perhaps most similar to Burundi in 
terms of the breakdown of ethnic peace and the resulting political collapse.  
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the prospects for democracy in the region according to the assertions of Przeworski and 
Limongi. As South Africa’s per capita income pushes beyond its current $7,275 value in 
consonance with an effective cooperative and competitive balance between the state, 
labor and private capitalists, so increases the certainty of South Africa’s sustained 
democracy. Gabon is an example of the extreme volatility of the reliance upon the oil 
industry. It suffered a 26% decrease in GDP per capita when its per capita incomes varied 
from $10,020 in 2008 to $7,411 in 2009 and then to $8,643 in 2010.172 Przeworski and 
Limongi’s analysis leads to a prediction that the Gabonese political system is more likely 
to maintain its current semi-democratic political characteristics because each of the 
measured levels is beyond the $6,000 watermark. However, the volatility of the current 
Gabonese economic situation increases the potential for reform because the state is in a 
position that is highly vulnerable to increased pressure by labor and private capitalists. 
GDP per capita in Senegal surpassed the $1,000 mark in 2007 and currently rests at 
$1,041.173 This places Senegal in Przeworski and Limongi’s “sweet spot” for a 
democratic transition that combined with positive trends in the ability of business to 
break its dependency on the state and labor’s capacity to press its agenda; further 
democratic gains may be on the horizon. Again, the election of Macy Sall may just prove 
this point. Burundi’s prospects are perhaps a bit more dismal. A per capita income of 
$192 in 2010 combined with a political economy that consists of a weak and corrupt 
government, repressed business environment and a lopsided, massively unskilled and 
unorganized labor force bodes particularly poorly for the near term emergence of true 
democracy or rapid economic development. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
Understanding the relationship between industrialization and democratization 
provides sufficient background discussion to address the prospects for democracy within 
the case study countries. By reviewing Sub-Saharan African political economies along 
                                                 
172 The World Bank. "World Bank Data Indicators: Gabon," Accessed April 10, 2012, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.  




the lines of this analysis, it is possible to view United States foreign aid programs and 
techniques through a different lens. This may serve to either reinforce current aid 
programs or provide support for the redirection of resources. It is not the purpose of this 
research effort to support or decry the impact of aid, though the argument for investment 
in lieu of aid certainly applies to and is supported by the Burundian case. The goal of 
promoting democracy can be expected to continue within U.S. foreign policy, as can the 
tying of aid to democratic metrics, for the foreseeable future even if it decreases in 
importance relative to other desires such as regional anti-terrorism capabilities.  
This type of analysis provides a means to target aid programs or state-promoted 
investment in supporting elements that may indirectly support democratic development 
and support political aims. In Burundi, the candidate that is most likely the furthest from 
true consolidated democracy of our case studies, clearly the reliance upon foreign donors, 
coffee and tea exports is destabilizing and creates continued uncertainty. Aid programs, if 
utilized at all, should be directed towards appropriate increases in technologies to 
increase production of alternate crops or towards the support of civil society groups that 
provide the opportunity to organize and mobilize agricultural labor. As another 
alternative, policy could support and incentivize business investments into providing 
baseline technologies for Burundi’s expanding raw material markets. It is recommended 
that aid in the Burundian case be minimal so as not to reinforce the resultant uncertainty 
and incentivize an environment of continued poor governance.  
Gabon provides an excellent example due to several indicators that political 
conditions are solidifying for the emergence of democracy. In this case, investments that 
assist in the development of non-oil industries, particularly the timber industry is 
beneficial from both a social and political perspective. This type of investment is in line 
with the Gabon Emergent plan put forth by President Bongo in 2009 and would provide a 
means of diversification and increased formal jobs for the Gabonese while showing non-
oil related international support for a semi-democratic leader, which incentivizes such 
styles of governance. This, in turn, provides an avenue to indirectly contribute to the 
openness of the Gabonese class system by providing a means to social mobility, the 
egalitarian value system by decreasing income inequality, a capitalist economy by 
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promoting private sector expansion, increased economic wealth via the development of 
export-oriented high value end items, and potentially, an increased opportunity to 
mobilize the associated labor force, which when added to the power of the oil labor force 
increases labor’s overall power in the three-way dynamic. Newly emboldened 
entrepreneurs and labor can reasonably be expected to pressure government to protect 
such gains and, as a result of U.S. influence, have an increased capacity to do so. The 
Gabonese state, vulnerable and malleable, can reasonably be expected to provide 
concessions, however slight, and thus U.S. policy has supported a stabilizing contribution 
to democratization within Sub-Saharan Africa.       
D. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
What is the nature of the relationship between industrialization and 
democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
Though a mere four case studies is hardly conclusive, the analysis supports the 
hypothesis that industrialization, as a process of economic diversification, is a necessary 
condition for modernization and development, which then shapes the conditions for the 
emergence and sustainment of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, 
industrialization is not dependent upon democratization; however, successful 
democratization is dependent upon diversified industrialization in the region. The 
relationship between industrialization and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa is one 
of interdependence and balance unique to the characteristics and capacity of three critical 
entities: the state, private capitalists and labor. For many Sub-Saharan African nations, 
diversified industrialization remains on the horizon alongside consolidated democracy. 
Neither has yet been achieved. In these instances, a relative imbalance in the power 
dynamic exists between the key entities, which align to autocratic tendencies in lieu of 
the democratic. Senegal, Gabon and Burundi each demonstrate this point. For others, 
such as South Africa, diversified industrialization exists and thrives alongside 
consolidated democracy. In this case, each of the well-developed key entities is able to 
exert effective pressure upon the others. This ability to effectively put pressure upon the 
other entities has developed over time and through the political, social and economic 
strain associated with the expansion of multiple industries. It is the key to stabilizing and 
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when necessary, restraining the power dynamic. Also, this same expansion 
simultaneously contributes to critical social requisites for democratization.  
This research has examined the nature of the relationship between 
industrialization and democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. These two variables prove 
to be key elements in discussions surrounding economic development, growth, foreign 
policy and governance on the African continent. The method has been to take a look at 
several case studies that highlight instances of positive and negative contributions to 
certain requisites for democracy. From this, I have been able to draw some general 
conclusions as to why democracy has or has not taken root from a social, economic and 
political perspective. Examining the relationships between the state, private capitalists 
and labor has been the vehicle for this analysis and provided a general understanding of 
how these relationships contribute to democracy and patterns of democratization. 
However, further analysis is appropriate. It would be useful to examine in further detail 
the different ways and volumes that extractive industries versus manufacturing contribute 
to governance, economics and social arenas. Also, because international players exert 
competing political and economic influence via their foreign policies, which 
simultaneously contribute to the industrial and democratic capacity of contemporary Sub-
Saharan African nations, a detailed examination of those policies would contribute 
significantly to the discussion. In terms of further research, taking a deeper look into 
these divisions of industry as well as examining “eastern” and “western” foreign policy 
within the region stands to provide even more useful insight into the industrialization and 











Africa  Gabon  Senegal  Burundi 
Agriculture  2%  24%  3%  4%  17%  35% 
Industry  29%  29%  31%  54%  22%  20% 
Manufacturing  16%  9%  15%  4%  13%  9% 
Services  69%  47%  66%  42%  61%  45% 










       
 
 
                                               
 
  







South Africa  Gabon  Senegal  Burundi 
Polity 2  Year  Polity 2  Year  Polity 2  Year  Polity 2  Year 
4  1910  ‐7  1960  ‐1  1960  0  1962 
5  1990  ‐9  1968  ‐4  1962  ‐3  1963 
6  1992  ‐6  1990  ‐7  1963  ‐5  1965 
8  1993  ‐4  1991  ‐6  1974  ‐7  1966 
9  1994  3  2009  ‐2  1978  ‐3  1992 
9  2010  3  2010  ‐1  1981  0  1993 
            8  2000  ‐5  1996 
            7  2007  ‐1  1998 
            7  2010  0  2001 
                  2  2002 
                  3  2003 
                  5  2004 
                  6  2005 
                  6  2010 
 










Figure 6.   Democracy - Polity IV Data (Polity 2 subset) Consolidated Line Graph (From 63)
91 
Modernization Assessment  
   South Africa  Gabon  Senegal  Burundi 
Sachs  Catching Up  Resource Based  Malthusian Decline  Malthusian Decline 
Rostow  Drive to Maturity  Pre‐Conditions  Pre‐Conditions  Traditional Society 
Porter  Investment Driven  Factor Driven  Factor Driven  Factor Driven 
   South Africa  Gabon  Senegal  Burundi 
Electrical Production (billion kWh)  238.3  1.963  2.232  0.208 
Electrical Consumption (billion kWh)  212.2  1.6  1.763  0.273 
   South Africa  Gabon  Senegal  Burundi 
Internet (User World Rank)  54  160  76  147 
Cell  Phones  Teledensity  per  100 
people  110  100  100+  10 
Table 17.   Modernization Assessment (From CIA World Factbook Country Reports) 
 
Scale 
   Modernity          Traditional   
Sachs 
Endogenous 






Porter  Innovation Driven     Investment Driven     Factor Driven 
Table 18.   The Modernity Scale (From 22, 127, 128)
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Tariff Structure 
   South Africa  Gabon  Senegal  Burundi 
Minerals  0.77%  10.40% 6.08%  1.93% 
Textiles  36.79%  26.80% 16.74%  21.74% 
Manufactured Items  24.66%  29%  19.23%  22.70% 
Machinery  2.14%  12.30% 8.65%  4.50% 
Instruments  0.21%  8.31%  8.15%  1.60% 
Other Manufactures  9.56%  25.20% 19.12%  20.80% 
Average Agriculture Tariff  9.86%  17.10% 11.59%  21.93% 
Average Industrial Tariff  4.95%  14%  10.08%  6.63% 
Table 19.   Tariff Structure (From 81) 
 







Africa  Gabon  Senegal  Burundi 
GDP per Capita  $7275  $8643  $1041  $192 
Income Highest 20%  72.2%  48.2%  45.9%  42.8% 
Income Lowest 20%  2.5%  6.2%  6.2%  9.0% 
Unemployment   24.9%  21.0%  48.0%  11% est 
Poverty  23.0%  32.0%  50.8%  68.0% 







74th  113th  121st  157th 
Doing Business Rank  35th  156th  154th  169th 
Ibrahim  Index  Average 
(2000–2010) 
7th (59.2) 39th (35.4)  17th  (51.3)  38th (36.4) 
Transparency  International 
(Corruption) 
4.5  2.8  2.9  1.8 
WEF  Indicator  1.09  (Burden 
of Government Regulation) 
3 of 7  NA  3.4 of 7  3.2 of 7 
WEF  Indicator  8.04  (Access 
to Bank Loans ) 
3.2 of 7  NA  2.3 of 7  1.6 of 10 
WEF Indicator 8.05 (Venture 
Capital Access) 
3 of 7  NA  2.3 of 7  1.5 of 7 
WEF  Indicator  1.14  (Cost  of 
Crime  and  Violence  on 
Business) 
2.1 of 7  NA  5.8 of 7  3.1 of 7 
WEF Indicator 8.06  9 of 10  NA  3 of 10  2.7 of 10 
 
Table 20.   Miscellaneous Common Indicators (Data from multiple sources: World Bank, 
International Finance Corporation, CIA Worldfactbook, Heritage Foundation, 
U.S. Department of State, World Economic Forum, Ibrahim Index) 
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